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14 October 1981

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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## CONTENTS

## THEATER FORCES

## FINLAND

- Paper Backs Nuclear-Free Zone Discussion at Nordic Meeting  
(Editorial, Henrik von Bonsdorff; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET,  
4 Sep 81)..... 1

## TERRORISM

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Background, Tactics of Latest Red Army Faction Attacks  
(DER SPIEGEL, 21 Sep 81)..... 4

## ECONOMIC

## BELGIUM

- Eyskens Defends Proposed 1982 Budget  
(Frans Verleyen, Toon Lowette; KNACK, 12 Aug 81)..... 9

## FINLAND

- Briefs  
Milk, Meat to USSR ..... 16

## GREECE

- PASOK Economic Program Analyzed  
(AKROPOLIS, 4 Sep 81)..... 17

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

Relations With PASOK Analyzed  
(L. Khristidis; I SIMERINI, 30 Aug 81)..... 20

Intercommunal Talks, Positions of Political Parties Analyzed  
(TO VIMA, 8 Sep 81)..... 22

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Poll Shows Drop in SPD Support, Rise of Green Party  
(FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 15 Sep 81)..... 27

GREECE

Ten Political Parties Competing in Elections  
(EPIKAIRA, 10-16 Sep 81)..... 30

ND Announces Complete List of Candidates  
(AKROPOLIS, 18 Sep 81)..... 37

Complete List of PASOK Candidates Published  
(ELEVTHEROTYPIA, 12 Sep 81)..... 57

KKE-Interior Candidates Listed  
(TO VIMA, 17 Sep 81)..... 66

KKE Announces Complete List of Candidates  
(RIZOSPASTIS, 20 Sep 81)..... 67

Progressive Party Candidates Listed  
(TO VIMA, 17 Sep 81)..... 78

Democratic Union Announces Platform  
(TO VIMA, 17 Sep 81)..... 82

Election Costs Projected  
(Ap. Strongylis; EPIKAIRA, 10-16 Sep 81)..... 86

TURKEY

Ilicak Examines NAP Separatism  
(Nazli Ilicak; TERCUMAN, 22 Aug 81)..... 89

Further Charges Against Nationalist Action Party Read  
(MILLIYET, 26 Aug 81)..... 92

MILITARY

FINLAND

- Subway System's Tunnels To Serve as Civil-Defense Shelters  
(Thure Malmberg; HUFVUDTADSBLADET, 6 Sep 81)..... 98

GENERAL

CYPRUS

- New Government Spokesman Post Announced  
(CYPRUS MAIL, 19 Sep 81)..... 106
- British Refuse To Renew Residence Permits  
(I SIMERINI, 29 Aug 81)..... 107

FRANCE

- Forthcoming Ariane Modifications, Improvements Viewed  
(LE MATIN, 14 Sep 81)..... 109

THEATER FORCES

FINLAND

PAPER BACKS NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE DISCUSSION AT NORDIC MEETING

Helsinki HUVVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 4 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial by Henrik von Bonsdorff: "Nordic Information Meeting"]

[Text] During their meeting in Copenhagen the Nordic foreign ministers devoted themselves, among other things, to an informed discussion, based on facts, of a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone. They also found this to be worthy of mention, for the first time, in the communique on the meeting. That can be regarded as a favorable phenomenon even though no new, concrete initiative such as was anticipated was taken, Henrik von Bonsdorff says.

Something happened in the debate concerning a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone. One can say that, since a somewhat more concrete treatment was accorded that subject for the first time at the traditional meeting of the Nordic ministers of foreign affairs, which took place during the last 2 days in Copenhagen this time. However, nothing really surprising was involved. Differences of opinion, especially within the ruling Norwegian Labor Party last fall, gradually gave rise to a surge of discussion in the other Nordic countries, too, and this unquestionably has made a group of interrelated problems currently interesting in a new way. And the Soviet president's hint, in SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI, at the possibility that a future agreement on a nuclear-free area could also conceivably include measures affecting the Soviet Union's territory introduced a new element into the debate, which, in spite of uncertainty as regards its real significance, nevertheless has a definite meaning.

However, it would nevertheless be a mistake to assert that the question of a nuclear-free area occupied a completely dominating position on the foreign ministers' agenda in Copenhagen. On the other hand, it is clear that that particular question captured most of the mass media's attention, as it presumably is also of interest to the public, which keeps up with "their excellencies'" doings in one way or another.

The exchange of views on the nuclear weapons-free zone took place behind locked doors and within a very limited circle consisting of the foreign ministers and their principal advisers. Therefore there is not a particularly large amount of substantial information on what was said which could be served to the public in our countries. In the extremely long communique, the conversation is

dealt with by citing a few generally-held views which almost drown in the extremely rich verbiage with which all the other intricate problems on the world's political scene are discussed. But nevertheless, in our opinion, the mere fact that the problem of a nuclear-free area has now been taken up for serious discussion and that subsequently, for the first time, as far as is known, that fact was noted in the resolution adopted at the meeting, is to be regarded as a favorable step. The communique says that the ministers informed each other regarding "the conditions which, taking as a starting point the situation in each of the respective countries as far as security policy is concerned, must apply to work on an area free of nuclear weapons in the nordic region." And they agreed that they would remain in contact regarding the work they proposed to do on that question in the future. These statements do not look like much, and one certainly could have wished for some more comprehensive and tangible clarifications of their ideas on how the problem might best be tackled now or in the future. But on the other hand it is clear that the aforementioned "conditions" differ constantly, and sometimes simply contradict each other in the different countries. That is something which still has not been changed in spite of expressions of opinion on the grass-roots level and the (at least outwardly declared) newly-aroused interest in Nordic freedom from nuclear weapons higher up in the social hierarchy.

On the Norwegian and Danish side, they are still clinging to the attitude that a Nordic nuclear-free area arrangement cannot be thought of as an isolated phenomenon. It would have to be planned as an element in a broader European disarmament arrangement. And here--it is to be hoped--the approaching contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union on European strategic weapons (TNF) are of decisive importance. As long as people do not know anything about what the possible results may be, the two Nordic NATO countries are probably not ready to contribute to a separate solution of the Nordic nuclear weapons equation.

Where Sweden is concerned, the reasoning runs pretty much along the same lines. Of course, Sweden is not bound in the same way as Denmark and Norway with respect to its NATO allies, who, among other things, have let the Norwegians know clearly that they would be uneasy about any Nordic initiatives--not so much for military reasons as with a view to possible resulting political effects elsewhere within the alliance. In June the Swedish parliament also urged the government to work in consultation with other Nordic countries in an attempt to find a common basis for a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone, and Olof Palme, the leader of the opposition, attracted attention immediately before the meeting in Copenhagen with a fiery appeal for an energetic Swedish effort on behalf of such an area. But in spite of that, people in Sweden are also sympathetic toward solutions "in a broader context" as a condition for the acceptance of a Nordic arrangement.

Finland's position, understandably, is somewhat different. Our foreign policy leadership certainly perceives, as Foreign Minister Vayrynen pointed out a few weeks ago, the connection between efforts to obtain disarmament and weapons control in broad outline, and the situation in the Nordic countries. In his opinion, however, that should not prevent work on a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone. Therefore, Finland is willing, even at the present stage, to actively pursue that goal. One contribution which could be made would be to try to

ascertain, through diplomatic contacts, what was concealed behind President Brezhnev's somewhat oracular statement. But in the present muddled situation it does not seem very likely that people in Moscow would be willing to lift the veil.

Therefore it may seem as if Nordic freedom from nuclear weapons may now be a subject which is pigeonholed for good, in spite of the foreign ministers' exchange of opinions in Copenhagen. That is a bleak view which reports on the meeting covering the last few days do not support. Instead, what we are confronted with is a wait-and-see situation. And then, noteworthy is also Foreign Minister Frydenlund's statement in a recent election debate, when he stressed that the question of an area free of nuclear weapons is also going to be an integral part of Norwegian politics during the Storting period after the election in Norway a little more than a week hence. That thesis can presumably apply to the entire Nordic region.

As was indicated above, the communique from the meeting in Copenhagen broke all previous records for length. The staff of clerks must have had a tough job sponging out all conceivable subjects about which one could say something worthwhile and constructive. The list was also too complete, if anything. Our attitude toward the usefulness of such collections of pious wishes in documents on that type was a bit hesitant on past occasions. That hesitancy continues to exist.

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## BACKGROUND, TACTICS OF LATEST RED ARMY FACTION ATTACKS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 21 Sep 81 pp 22-26

[Article: "Brutal Execution, Blow Upon Blow"]

[Text] After the attacks in Heidelberg and Ramstein the West Germany security authorities are expecting a wave of terrorism. The "Red Army Faction," given up for dead, is shooting again. In the process, the assassins are taking great risks into the bargain: undaunted, they are sticking to plans for action that have already become known to the police.

In the Heidelberg "Little Carmelites' Wood," between the castle and the Neckar, there arrived three men and a woman in a camper with Austrian license plates. They were carrying an igloo tent and sleeping bags, tools, a "ptt marc" CB radio and provisions.

They camped in sloping terrain and hewed and sawed an opening in the woods to give them an unimpeded view on the Neckar and Federal Highway 37.

The group--sometimes only one and sometimes all four of them--spent days at the place. Then, Tuesday last week a CB signal came from the lock chamber opposite. Putting their sandwiches and yogurt aside, they grabbed their weapons.

A Russian RPC-7W antitank rocket launcher and eight shots from a submachinegun demolished a light-green Mercedes 450. The passengers: Gen Frederick James Kroesen, supreme commander of the 200,000-men-strong U.S. Army in Europe, and company.

The general was lucky. A second rocket did not score a hit, and the first one had only hit the trunk of the limousine. The submachinegun fire had not penetrated the armored chassis.

The rocket having hit centimeters back of the side window, Kroesen and his wife escaped with minor cuts. His aide-de-camp and the driver were unhurt. "If they had scored proper hits," said Guenter Ermisch, deputy chief of the Wiesbaden Federal Criminal Police Bureau (BKA), "they would all have been finished."

Just as after the attack on the U.S. base at Ramstein, in which 20 people had been hurt a couple of weeks before, this time too the Red Army Faction (RAF), in a

letter of admission postmarked Aschaffenburg, claimed the copyright for the assassination attempt, stating, "With the Gudrun Esslin Commando, today we attacked the supreme commander of the U.S. Army and of the Europe-Center NATO sector, General Kroesen."

And just as after Ramstein, when the cars of GI's were burned in Wiesbaden, this time too there followed a supplementary action the next day--the fifth attack against U.S. military installations in 2 1/2 weeks. On a railroad track leading to the U.S. airbase at Frankfurt Airport, a soldier discovered two fire extinguishers equipped with time fuses and each filled with 6 kilograms of explosives.

There was just enough time to defuse the bombs, which would have exploded within an hour and probably would also have destroyed a bridge of the Frankfurt-Mannheim autobahn 20 meters away.

While General Kroesen was joking hours after the assassination attempt that he was "glad they did not use any U.S. weapons," pursuers of terrorists and others prepared for worse things to come. Minister of Interior Gerhart Baum, FDP, publicly professed that he was afraid there would be further attacks. Federal Prosecutor General Kurt Rebmann rushed to the location of the crime in Heidelberg and stated that the crowd of RAF supporters was on the increase again.

The shots on Kroesen were fired a couple of days after the action of rioters during the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig to Berlin. Leaflets fluttering up from the Berlin underground mentioned the unsuccessful RAF attack against Haig a couple of years earlier with a note of regret--"2.7 seconds too late."

BKA Deputy Chief Ermisch is afraid his bureau will soon "face a wave of violence." He can form a quite concrete picture of dangerous configurations. For instance, if a peace demonstrator was killed in confrontations with the police, people might do what has not happened so far: Flock to the support of the RAF. Says Ermisch: "A Benno Ohnesorg effect."

The BKA analyses of the acts of violence of the past 16 days are worrisome enough. Nine days after the first deadly attacks on U.S. bases in Frankfurt and Heidelberg, one is witnessing the end of a phase of terrorist inconspicuousness which some had already believed to be the exit of the scene. Despite the fact that the core of the terrorist groups has been weakened by pursuit and defections, a new period of action is becoming apparent.

Those fighting terrorism assume that

-- members of the terrorist associations RAF and "2 June," which have now merged, are proceeding systematically from planning to the execution of acts of violence;

-- mutually independent "Revolutionary Cells" execute their own violent actions, as if on a signal, following RAF attacks;

-- top terrorists who had fled abroad are again becoming active in the Federal Republic.

Added to this is a heretofore unknown readiness to take risks on the part of West German terrorists. They adhere strictly to plans which have long since become known to the police--and despite the fact that these plans are known to the police. Says a BKA investigator: "Brutal execution, blow upon blow."

An "amazing fidelity to plans" is the conclusion which pursuers drew from the letters of admission in Heidelberg and Ramstein. Quite obviously the letters had been typed in advance, with only the dates filled in after execution.

It is amazing: Now, to a large extent, those complex police puzzles which during the boom of West German terrorism had to be assembled laboriously after the actions have already been completed before the attacks--and the actions take place nevertheless.

Thus security officials long ago had started following tacks which all pointed in one direction--to the fact that terrorists had their sights set on U.S. bases and on leading U.S. military personnel.

In the end, last October, they found in a conspiratorial apartment in Heidelberg-Rohrbach clear allusions to a "strategy paper" of the RAF people around Christian Klar, Adelheid Schulz and Brigitte Mohnhaupt. The key passage: "An OFF (offensive) at various levels--at the mil. [military one] against U.S. Army and BUWE (bases) and characters."

Even before, according to findings by the then BKA head, Horst Herold, 18 RAF members in 9 vehicles had been "engaged in preparatory action" in the area between Stuttgart and Heidelberg "for an attack on a NATO base." Only a car accident near Bietigheim which killed two of the persons involved, Juliane Plambeck and Wolfgang Beer, according to Herold prevented the action "5 minutes before midnight."

From the car involved in the accident in Bietigheim, a track led to the Rohrbach apartment, where 4 DM 1,000 bills and 11 DM 500 bills and about 100,000 French francs from the ransom of a kidnaping were discovered. Juliane Plambeck had been one of the women who had kidnaped Vienna hosiery king Michael Palmers in 1977 and blackmailed him for DM 4.5 million.

The fact that "the war chest was still full" did not worry the BKA pursuers too much. What alarmed them was other finds--detailed plans and sketches of the NATO airport in Ramstein in the Palatinate and topographical maps of Heidelberg.

Among the Rohrbach materials, the pursuers attached key importance above all to the strategy paper, which was taken to be a "guidance for action for all groupings that believed themselves capable of preparations and actions." "This is a bible," said one investigator.

The fact that, as in the Ramstein case, there was an action pending in Heidelberg that had been known to officers of the Baden-Wuertemberg Land Criminal Police Bureau (LKA), because some days before the attack, U.S. General Kroesen himself had informed the LKA that he had been under observation by a couple of people on a motorcycle on Highway 37, in the proximity of the place of the attack.

Investigations revealed that the Honda carried a forged license plate (HD - LD 291). And just how exact the picture which the pursuers of the terrorists had formed was, readers of a local paper, the RHEIN-NECKAR-ZEITUNG, were able to inform themselves on as early as 14 June:

"A terrorist attack, the preparations for which have already taken concrete form, has been planned or is still being planned against one or more high-ranking officer of the headquarters of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe (USAREUR) on the Roemerstrasse in Heidelberg. According to reliable information, the plan was or may still be to attack...a U.S. officer en route from his residence to headquarters. Indications are that the attack was to be executed before duty hours."

Despite such advanced knowledge, counterintelligence last week did not know exactly "just who it was" who then executed the attacks. Similarly the members of revolutionary cells, to whom the great majority of altogether 10 attacks against U.S. military installations in West Germany have been attributed this year, remained in obscurity.

One thing was certain, however: The same people had fired and laid bombs in Heidelberg and Ramstein. The pursuers thought they were sure about the "identity of the group of culprits." They thought they had found out who had pulled the underground strings in the attacks.

Immediately before the Ramstein attack, police detected a 1975 to 1977 red Ford Escort GL exceeding the speed limit at an autobahn construction site near Stuttgart. The radar trap showed the license plate (K - AJ 4819) and a front view of the driver.

The owner of the vehicle, however, was able to prove that he had not driven on that autobahn that day. It appeared that, following an old RAF practice, the terrorists had had his license plate copied and had used it unlawfully.

With the help of so-called physiognometric evaluations, the BKA finally figured out the possible identity of the driver in the traffic photo--Christian Klar, the top terrorist wanted by the police since the murders of Siegfried Buback, Juergen Ponto and Hanns Martin Schleyer, and who on two previous occasions had barely slipped through BKA hands.

Covert pursuit of the Ford, however, yielded neither the car nor the driver. Eyewitnesses of the Ramstein who were shown the pictures were not sure whether they had seen the man before.

And when television pursuer Eduard Zimmermann presented the radar case ("File XY... unsolved") on ZDF [Second German Television Program] last Friday, a viewer in Cologne came forward and claimed that he was the driver of the Ford in question.

The duplicated license plate had been based on an error in the production of license plates which he had found out in the meantime. Now his car had been equipped with the correct license plate. The BKA determined that the man was right. The pursuers had been on the wrong track.

In searching for the people who had staged the double blow against the U.S. military, analysts in the TE (terrorism) Division of the BKA hit on an oldtimer of the West German underground--kindergarten teacher Inge Viett, 37.

This activist of the former "2 June Movement" had drawn the attention of a police patrol in Paris on 4 August because she was riding a motorcycle without a crash helmet. When one of the offivers overtook her in the Montparnasse district and wanted to stop her, she got off, drew a gun, fired at the cop and fled.

Viett's fingerprints had been obtained in the Paris apartment in which the police had arrested presumed terrorists Sieglinde Hoffmann, Ingried Barabass and three women accomplices in May last year. In the car involved in the accident at Beitingheim, there had been found instructions for planned car thefts in Viett's handwriting.

The pursuers assume that Inge Viett might have used the Honda motorcycle which was found near the place of the crime after the Ramstein attack. She might also have been on the pillion of the Honda from which General Kroesen thought he had been observed.

Besides, one day after the attack in Heidelberg, some Stuttgart citizens identified the woman driver of a blue VW bug with forged license plates as the person wanted by the police, and she also drew the attention of a guard at a U.S. exchange in Bad Canstatt and of U.S. military police.

Both, Inge Viett and Christian Klar, were qualified to handle the RPS-7W rocket launcher--a weapon presumably supplied by the Palestinian liberation organization PLFP and used by RAF shots once before.

As early as 1975 Frankfurt terrorist Wilfried Boese had fired together with an accomplice at a passenger plane of the Israeli El Al Airline taking off at Paris-Orly Airport. The rockets, however, hit only an empty Yugoslav plane. Technical drawings of the 40-mm weapon, whose projectiles can penetrate 20-cm-thick steel-plates from a distance of 150 meters, have also been found before in a conspiratorial apartment.

The fact that despite clear indications it was possible for the two latest attacks to occur at all and that the culprits had not been seized by the end of last week once more is due to breakdowns in pursuit.

As soon as Helmut Pohl, sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for a bank raid and membership in a criminal association, had been released, the BKA subjected him to "Befa 7" (surveillance) with the idea that Pohl would lead the police to those activists who were then preparing the attacks of Ramstein and Heidelberg.

But despite the fact that the surveillance was constantly increased--engaging 30 officers since October 1980--he escaped. Fingerprints discovered later show that he had arrived where the police had wanted him to lead them--the hard core of the RAF.

There, chances are, a Gisela Dutzi from Mannheim is also playing her part. She too had been able to vanish despite surveillance and has been on the wanted-persons list since last month. The last traces of her had been found in the Rohrback apartment.

On a blueprint, police technicians discovered fingerprints and perhaps an indication of where the RAF will attack next. Dutzi's fingerprints were found on survey maps of the U.S. base "Hammonds Barracks" in Mannheim.

**EYSKENS DEFENDS PROPOSED 1982 BUDGET**

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 12 Aug 81 pp 10-13

[Report on interview with Prime Minister Mark Eyskens on the 1982 Budget by Frans Verleyen and Toon Lowette: "Gentlemen, We'll Resume the Hostilities"; passages in slantlines printed in italics.]

[Text] When Prime Minister Mark Eyskens proposed the tax on conspicuous signs of wealth at his budget conference, the din in the ground-floor hall of the Egmont Palace responded with: /That looks like a certain degree of anxiety./ The tax on evidence of wealth is one of the many points of what he called the most difficult budget since World War II. The ministers heeded the admonition of the European Community and the desire of the bankers of the High Council of Finance who wanted to see the budget deficit limited to 200 billion francs. It became 201.6 billion, but never mind. The state debt will increase by 354 billion and will remain /limited/ to 9 percent of the national product. For every 100 francs Belgium will produce next year, there will be 9 francs of new debt. The state will spend 1,341.6 billion francs and receive 1,140.00 billion francs if everything goes as expected.

All items turned out lower than the expected increase of inflation -- 6.8 percent -- except those of Foreign Commerce and Middle Classes, which are being stimulated, and that of the national debt, of course. In general, the purchasing power is decreasing and the gentlemen had to correct the results of that on the income side just the night before. Earning less also means paying less taxes. What is notable in the budget are the measures against unemployment and the handing over of 2 percent by everyone, the so-called crisis contribution. In the employers' organization VBO [Federation of Belgian Enterprisers] , which already had voiced its protest through Director Tony Vandeputte, there was fear that workdays will be lost in the coming months through strikes against the violating of the collective labor agreement made earlier this year. Father Robert Vandeputte, the minister of finance, already expressed his uneasiness on Friday about the way the budget had been drawn up. A great number of political concessions and compromises were more than he could swallow with his technical, traditional view on the matter.

Perhaps it is partly through his doing that the CVP [Social Christian Party] almost completely recognizes its own economization plan in the 1982 budget. If one puts the budget next to the plans worked out a week earlier by the CVP at its budget council in Steenokkerzeel, an unusually great likeness will be noticed.

The hiring ceiling and mobility of civil servants is approved. The non-application of one of the index adjustments is replaced by a crisis contribution, with the same numerical result. The tax on substitute incomes, like most economization measures, is included in the unemployment sector: a more selective premium system and BTK [expansion unknown] obligatory re-training, a stricter control on partial unemployment, etc. The economizations in health insurance have been approved. According to the CVP, 13 billion francs had to be cut from the child support sector. That is going to be 7 billion, plus 4.5 billion for singles and couples without children, something which had been urged in spite of the resistance of the socialist group. The municipal fund has been restructured, as requested, and in the area of National Education more is being economized in the two networks and regions than the CVP had asked for. The rates of public services are going to be increased, not by 8 but by 4.5 billion francs. Splitting and dispersal are being pushed back; the yield won't be 20 but 10 billion, plus 5.5 billion francs from the revision of the reductions, an alternative suggested by the CVP in a footnote. And the evidence-of-wealth tax was introduced for the higher incomes. With a few exceptions -- such as the curtailment of government investments -- the CVP was successful on all its points.

Meanwhile the FINANCIAL TIMES noted that the coupling of the index is still being kept intact. The reason is not as much that all government partners are convinced that the index has its usefulness, as that the state loses money in uncoupling the index. Although the treasury would then pay less wages, it also would take in less tax on private earnings, which are much greater in volume. The net loss of a complete uncoupling could approach 10 billion francs according to one member of the cabinet.

This year the budget was influenced more than in the past by the current currency situation, in particular the high exchange of the dollar. Prime Minister Eyskens said on that: "My General Economics course for candidates in economic science still states: One dollar is 50 francs. Ten years ago, at the time of the devaluation of the American currency, I told my students that I would not adjust that because there would be a time when the dollar would again be traded at 50 francs. Well, that time has almost arrived."

[Question] The budget demands a lot from the public. Is it a deflationary budget?

Eyskens: There is no deflation in Belgium. If prices are still rising by 8 percent per year, there is inflation, not deflation. Thus the budget is not deflationary either, due to the still remaining deficit of 200 billion francs. But the problem is more complicated than that. Because of the deficit in the balance of payments, purchasing power is flowing out to other countries, and that is deflationary. Amongst other things, we borrow abroad for that debt and the purchasing power, and that money in turn brings purchasing power to the country. Thus it is a question of balance. The budget is indeed a chipping-in budget in order to protect the state apparatus against destabilization. The government is in a position of self-creating deficit, a debt which continues to increase by itself. That won't be solved in just one year. If we let everything simply take its course, then even a destabilization of the political system is possible in Belgium and then the continued existence of the country might even be questioned. In the neighboring countries the budget is also a difficult operation, but here there is, moreover, a communal spark in the tinder.

[Question] Was that noticeable again now?

Eyskens: Definitely. To start with, in the regional budgets. The regions think they are getting too little; the state believes it is giving them too much. But the communal aspect played an even bigger role in the 230 billion francs of National Education. In spite of a tug of war, the French-speaking part was curtailed by 6.5 billion francs and the Dutch-speaking part by 1.5 billion, so that now both wings have the same rhythm of growth. That has important consequences for Wallonia because that part of the country is already farther ahead with the Revised Secondary Education. In a few years time the budget measures will be felt in Flanders.

[Question] Perhaps deflation is too strong a word. The economic successes seem to come from countries with a monetaristic policy. But Belgium doesn't have a Reagan budget yet.

Eyskens: The policy of the National Bank is partly monetaristic with its high interest rate and support of the franc. Perhaps Reagan is attaining political successes in the United States, but his experiments are only just starting. The social consequences will not fail to show up, and when I see that he finds it necessary to have union leaders arrested, then I am beginning to wonder.

The monetaristic policy of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom is one that was rejected by the social body. Belgium is too open a country for such an /island policy/. Experiments cannot be made here. François Mitterrand, who starts from the basis of the thrifty Raymond Barre, pushes expenditures up by 23 percent in one year. That is a different policy. But we have used that for 20 years already. The Belgian state now is one of the weakest administrations of Europe. And yet everything was all right until 1973, with small deficits. Two fatal things happened along with the oil crisis, however. One was the reform of the budget, the worst of which was that the writing off of the public debt was removed from the ordinary budget items and became a chapter in itself. Before that the discharge of the debt was included in the regular budget figure, but now no longer.

[Question] Was that a clever trick then?

Eyskens: I'm not saying that. But the budget discipline was being undermined. And secondly the 16 percent inflation rate in 1974 became fatal for us. That was the highest inflation rate since the time of Emperor Charles. He was an inflation specialist, for he was an elected emperor. Admittedly he had only seven voters, the electors, and we have many thousands, but the principle is the same. In 1974, when the liberals controlled the department of finance, the budget rose even more, by as much as 25 percent in one year.

[Question] Don't you see any benefit in "less state," less government interference?

Eyskens: What is the state? The central administration consists of 80,000 people, but altogether there are 900,000 wage earners in the public authorities. There was an inflation in public service, especially in the related bodies, education and the municipalities. We must not be hypocritical; the question is

not whether the state must stop interventions in industry -- industrial managers who reject the state from a platform sometimes ask right afterward whether their dossier can be processed even faster -- but just how efficient this basis of the welfare state really is. If interventions by the state mean nothing but buying the vote of the voter, then something is wrong. France is more state oriented than Belgium. It has been that way since Charles de Gaulle, and Valery Giscard d'Estaing did not change that situation -- quite the contrary. But over here every appointment in industry immediately smells of political patronage.

[Question] The state is continually visible to the citizen through the media. Isn't it making itself ridiculous by continually demanding money and simultaneously declaring itself bankrupt?

Eyskens: Sometimes a schizophrenic situation is being presented: the citizen is comfortably sitting in his chair and the government is outside, the cold monster. But the standard of living is more than half dependent on the state. Meanwhile the government has reduced its operating costs over 10 years from 16 percent to 14 percent of the national product. The explosion is in the social transfers and education. The army can no longer march, public works have been curtailed, and civil servants don't earn great money either. But numerous election rounds have sharpened political patronage, and that costs money. The state also has had to take care of the unemployed. The additional 300,000 unemployed and 120,000 additional civil servants together already cost 250 billion francs.

[Reporter] The government admits freely that the purchasing power of the population is decreasing due to the budget measures. Minister of Finance Vandepitte, amongst others, confirms that. Is it economically justified to reduce that purchasing power in crisis years? Is the cause of the crisis the fact that consumers consume too much?

Belgium is a sieve, claims Prime Minister Eyskens. Forty, 50 or 60 percent of any new income goes abroad. The deficit in the balance of payments reduces the purchasing power. One can compensate for that, but not in an open country such as Belgium. But economic debates give way to reality, he says; now it is sauve qui peut [save himself who can]. In spite of the Belgian capital market, which is the most spongelike in the world, the limits of /financing capacity/ are coming into view, with a government debt which will probably rise by over 400 billion francs in 1982.

Can an improvement be expected now that many families again have tighter limits for large purchases, vacation, building and renovating, and borrowing? Yes, the prime minister answers, the families will have to live with smaller limits and the state will also order less from industry. Some circles have been pleading for years for a modification of the index which, according to the personal opinion of the prime minister, is an exceptional system with advantages and disadvantages but currently probably disadvantageous for employment opportunity. However, when a curtailment of the purchasing power is organized in a /different manner/, those same circles are angry. The crisis contribution of wage earners must be seen as follows: it is equal to the skipping of an index adjustment on behalf of the government accounts. That is not to the advantage of companies, but /the competition indicator improves for Belgium/ says Mark Eyskens.

Although imports are expensive due to the expensive dollar, many companies export much more easily and that is good for certain companies and sectors. Companies which maintained their position during the crisis, now often are feeling a gradual improvement. That is especially the case in the textile sector. Also in steel, but there the problems are different. There the plans are those of last resort. Eyskens says that the steel bosses and the unions are keenly aware of that, especially since the European Commission is keeping a sharp eye on Belgium, which supports its steel companies most generously. They are also aware of the fact that no Flemish politician will approve billions of francs again for the steel industry in the future, so that the dossier continues to be explosive. A political crisis with a power vacuum would have catastrophic results, and for Flanders also. Next April two shipyards will be out of work. With the more expensive dollar, sharper competition and a higher quality, orders could still come in, but the situation is serious in shipbuilding also.

Meanwhile the chance for political crisis continues to be great. The government has ordered technicians to develop various scenarios for various points -- such as children's support which has to be curtailed -- so that the politicians can decide in September. The budget has already been drawn up in contract form. The government partners can still modify means of execution, but not the big lines. Although the government has found cohesion, in September the political parties will awaken from their vacation sleep, and the protests of groups and pressure groups, from electricity trusts to "the large-family association," will make the political system wobbly again. The prime minister hopes that the 4 months from September until the beginning of 1982 will be sufficient to ward off the attacks.

How much saving is being realized per department the prime minister didn't say at his conference. He doesn't want jealousy among his departments right away. He did say, though, that all budgets will remain below the inflation rhythm of 6.8 percent, except for Foreign Commerce -- plus 11.5 percent to encourage export -- and Middle Classes with its KMO [small business administration] premiums. Meanwhile we learned that Employment and Labor, for example, has been brought down from 135 to 96 billion francs. But there will be 15 billion francs of income from the crisis contribution. The remaining part comes from savings on unemployment. The Martens measures for curtailment of support to unemployed persons who are not heads of households are being felt; toward the end of 1982 almost 80,000 people will receive lower benefits. The remainder will be stricter control and the new system of general occupational retraining. But surely that doesn't mean that there is more work for them?

Eyskens: Right. But our regimentation is broad, and the package is becoming unpayable. Selections have to be made, and then too it is important to know who wants to work and who doesn't. With the regulations currently in force enough selectivity is possible, but it is difficult to apply them. If the RVA [National Labor Supply Service] sends someone to a company and he doesn't want to work, he can be removed from unemployment benefits, but it almost never happens. Retraining increases the chance for employment and, although it is not intentional, one result of it is a distinction on the basis of willingness to work.

The military budget is also below the predicted inflation rhythm. National defense would increase by 5.9 percent and that is less than what the United States

wants. But it is still fairly high compared to other items: Public Works + 2.5 percent; Traffic + 2.1; Posts, Telephone and Telegraph - 0.9; Employment and Labor + 0.1; Social Welfare + 3.2 percent. Belgium continues to be a faithful NATO ally but is moderating its defense expenditures.

[Question] Is there European consensus on that?

Eyskens: Certainly. The United States has to realize that its desires for increased military budgets are unpayable for Europe.

[Question] Has the coalition situation improved after this work in the bunker of the cabinet council?

Eyskens: It is much better. After the many meeting days a certain camaraderie arose, a certain sense of humor, a sort of atmosphere of conspiracy. Sometimes I said in the morning: "Gentlemen, we'll resume the hostilities." But there have been some fights too. Of course, we all are different in character, ideology and taboos. But I do believe that all of us have surrendered some taboos. The fact that the political parties dance around that turns everything into a Chinese shadow game. Of course it is unique in the world that a national government relies on purely regional parties, with the CVP as a polarization of the expression of majority in Flanders and the PS [Socialist Party] in Wallonia. Those parties shoot at each other but never make a hit. Moreover, they are never confronted with the same electorate. The voter never sanctions the fight. That gives cause to alarming questions on its operability. I experience that every day.

[Question] Will you get peace and quiet now? Will the CVP be satisfied with the extent to which its ideas have been incorporated?

Eyskens: I am outside of the fray; I must unblock situations. When the four savings plans were submitted, my collaborators and I looked for efficient ways which could produce 200 billion francs and for what was politically attainable. We came to approximately 200 billion. I said: "If we realize one third of that, it will be a success." Well, it turned out to be that way, approximately. The CVP ministers played a clever game. Leader Jos Chabert would probably answer that the CVP plan has been accepted practically entirely.

[Question] What will be the tax on the conspicuous evidence of wealth?

Eyskens: Belgium is one of the few countries without a property tax, and that's not possible here either. Only the real estate [tax] is known here and that is already being assessed through the cadastre and registrations. The personal property [tax] is not known here, and it wouldn't last long. A small increase on the highest incomes is a possibility, but then one gets to tax brackets of 80 percent and more. Moreover one has to strike the one who is cheating, for that is the unjust one. If evidence of wealth is established, then the standard of living is being examined, and thus cheaters will be exposed. Barre has developed such a law in France. One point for those who have a tennis court, a horse, a second home, a yacht, a secretary. A second home abroad is three points, etc.

Many points mean high taxes. But it won't become an inquisition. Those who are worried should simply look up that law by Barre. That man is not at all suspected of leftist tendencies.

[Question] Will there be a Maribel II?

Eyskens: Maribel I is running just as predicted. The bad weather and the dollar are bigger problems for the index than Maribel. It is a useful operation, for industry is freed of a quarter of its social contributions. In October we are expecting an evaluation report. If it is positive, we can consider a second operation for next year.

[Question] Does the program include devaluation?

Eyskens: The franc is behaving very decently. With a deficit on the balance of trade of 200 billion francs per year, support to the franc of 4 billion francs per week is very normal.

[Question] But isn't there pressure for a general currency adjustment in Europe?

Eyskens: The National Bank and the government are vigorously resisting an isolated adjustment of the parity of the franc. If the EEC decides collectively to adjust currencies, it is negotiable. That was sometimes done in the past, but now it is on no one's agenda. When Commission Chairman Ortoli visited here recently, he stated, however, that there was no need for currency adjustments in Europe. The dollar is the problem.

[Question] But a political crisis could accelerate matters?

Eyskens: Yes.

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CSO: 3105

ECONOMIC

FINLAND

BRIEFS

MILK, MEAT TO USSR--Finland has agreed to big food deals with the Soviet Union. According to the agreement, Finland will deliver meat and milk products worth a total of approximately 72 million marks. The deliveries will include 6 million kilograms of meat, 1 million kilograms of butter, 1 million kilograms of powdered milk and 1/2 million kilograms of cheese. The transaction will greatly ease the pressure where Finnish agriculture's overproduction is concerned. Among other things, those engaged in meat production have had marketing difficulties, even though an agreement was reached recently on the delivery of 1 million tons of beef to Italy. Because of agriculture's overproduction, exports of food to the Soviet Union are rising to record figures this year, for instance. Specifically, the value of the food being exported is approaching 600 million marks. [Text] [Helsinki HUVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 4 Sep 81 p 17] 9266

CSO: 3109/249

**PASOK ECONOMIC PROGRAM ANALYZED**

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 4 Sep 81 p 7

Text 7 The electoral campaign, together with PASOK's conflicting and incomprehensible economic program, no doubt plays a very serious role in the country's economic developments. Last week we had specific evidence on how adverse the effect is on the Stock Exchange.

In the meantime, an interview was given by A. Papandreu designed to reassure the public and put to rest its fears as to what is going to happen in the event an economic plan such as that enunciated by PASOK is actually implemented. But we think that, instead, the interview increased the confusion and caused concern even among the workers and employees who were supposed to benefit from the nationalizations. At least at this moment, when he speaks about the poor bureaucracies of the public enterprises and advocates turning today's "formalistic" control into a "real" control of the banks--although until yesterday he was advocating the end of the monetary commission no less--in conjunction with the participation of the employees in their management, it is clear that he faults the personnel at the very time he advocates a change in the current conditions of work and remuneration.

**How Are They Going to Be More Effective?**

How are the already nationalized enterprises going to be made more efficient just by changing the name to "socialized" unless the activity of the employees is "intensified"--and this is one of the reasons he makes them co-responsible through their ostensible membership in management--and unless the payroll is reduced? Unless at the same time he increases prices to cover their deficits, because he also spoke of the uneconomical operation of public enterprises. In any event he does not conceal this fact. He said that the participation of the employees in management will decisively contribute to a rise in productivity. He will make the employees work more industriously. He also spoke of private enterprise criteria on efficiency and other similar questions. But most of these enterprises are supposed to be operating in this fashion today according to the related legislation.

But the possible interventions are dictated by other expedient considerations of social policy, etc. How is Papandreu going to overcome them? Whom is he planning to put in charge?--bureaucrats and technocrats or entrepreneurs?

Papandreu gave in this same interview different meanings to the term "socialization," but still such meanings were not clear. With regard to the banks, socialization means among other things exclusive control and "real application" of the present "formal" state control. The participation of the employees in management is expected to contribute to this!

In the case of public utilities--including energy--mass transportation, major mining enterprises, major shipyards, steel mills, cement, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals and national defense industries, socialization means "serving the public instead of the big business interests as is the case today."

In other words, Papandreu will nationalize, for instance, the aluminum /industry/ (exploitation of mineral resources) or he will not give electricity to this and the nickel industries as well as to other industries except at higher rates which may prohibit their operation beyond the prices prevailing internationally.

If he does not give electricity at competitive rates they will close down. If he nationalizes them he will be obligated to give them cheap electricity, but where is he going to sell the output of the big enterprises in the event it is exportable?

#### Difficulties

Here we have been trying to create not another aluminum industry but alumina only and we have seen how difficult it is. With regard to aluminium the difficulty facing the concerned enterprises is the cost of electricity. When the enterprise is public the problem of marketing will be added since for better or worse a few international monopolies control the world market. With regard to alumina which does not need electricity the problem is in marketing.

Something similar applies to other enterprises which may be nationalized whether they produce for export or for the domestic market. These are questions of price and competition unless we go to a closed economy. In the latter case, the first thing will be for us to get out of the EEC whether we like it or not. Yet, PASOK does not deal at all with those questions.

It is fine to talk about what he says with regard to private initiative and the support he is planning to give it at a time when it is ready to leave town in the event PASOK wins the election. Support here will go to the small enterprises--many votes--but with means and systems which are already in existence. And what if the small enterprises at some time in the future become large? Is it not their ambition to grow?

But those enterprises will have to stay small because if they grow they are in danger of being nationalized. What kind of initiative can they develop?

For the medium to small enterprises whose real strength he considers considerable--something nobody questions--he offers no new program beyond the programs already in existence. He talks to them about credits and supply cooperatives, about something that already exists. But, of course, a country cannot depend on medium to small enterprises only, nor can they exist without the large enterprises. The steel mills will supply the metal the small enterprise can utilize.

On the overextended, large enterprises, Papandreou was more careful this time and more down to earth. He spoke about a review of their viability, etc. Then, giving a third meaning to socialization--during the same interview he contradicts himself in the case of the large corporations which are heavily in debt--he said that the policy of PASOK socializations is designed to assure social control in certain basic sectors and that this policy has anti-monopoly and anti-dependence character. And he does not talk about limiting credits.

#### Compensation

The socialization with the meaning of nationalization--here we have another meaning of the same term--will move ahead "after a careful study of the special conditions in each case." And where we have socialization of this type there will be compensation. In other words, we will have nationalizations--with caution which could mean nothing--with compensation and since we know that there is no money there will be given instead some kind of debentures or whatever. And those nationalized will have to wait--something tantamount to confiscation.

Let us not talk about foreign investments. Nobody will bring any money in when there is a risk of nationalization. In commerce there will be a social agency--this is another form of socialization--which will intervene in the market place when there is overpricing. The old version regarding the socialization "of the big export-import trade" is not repeated.

What really stung Papandreou was the charge about confiscations, as well as the farmers' fear regarding compulsory cooperatives for the land. For this reason he spoke about land ownership and voluntary participation.

In any event, PASOK's statements play a negative role in the country's economic life.

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CSO: 4621/104

## RELATIONS WITH PASOK ANALYZED

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 30 Aug 81 p 12

[Article by L. Khristidis: "PASOK and Cyprus"]

[Text] The interest of the Greek [political] parties in the Cyprus question is flaring up in a phenomenal way these days. Feeling perhaps that they could derive benefits in view of the forthcoming elections, the Greek politicians are more and more frequently coming out with statements in Cyprus. The statements by the PASOK leader particularly have created in Cyprus a climate of such as I SIMERINI. Since the possibilities for a PASOK victory have increased, it would be timely to speak about this party and how it could affect the Cyprus question in the event it wins the elections.

PASOK started out as a purely socialist movement. From the very beginning it was staffed with cadres who embraced Marxism and who adopted as their model the Tito regime in Yugoslavia--a purely communist regime which differed from other communist states in that it followed a policy of nonalignment. In the 1974 elections PASOK received 12 percent [of the total votes] and in 1977, campaigning on the same objectives and positions, received 25 percent while the strength of the Center dropped by about the same percentage (from 25 to 12 percent). In other words, a number of followers of the Center shifted to PASOK. However, it would be unrealistic to claim that they suddenly adopted the PASOK Marxist position. They supported PASOK simply because they recognized the incompetency of their party leadership and because they traditionally oppose the governments of the Right. PASOK Chairman Andreas Papandzeou realized that this switch-over by centrist voters created conditions favorable for a victory in the next elections provided he was successful in gaining also the rest of the undecided voters of the Center. Since then in his statements Papandzeou shows a turn toward social-democracy and milder positions toward EEC, NATO, etc. But the party's Marxist cadres have reacted very intensively since they hate both social-democracy and capitalism. The tension peaked this year with protests and resignations. The various trends took their most extensive form in the student sector. During the student elections in Salonica [Universtiy], in addition to the PASOK youth, a new front made its presence known--the "Movement for PASOK's Strategy in the Student Movement." This front was joined by the ablest and most aggressive PASOK student cadres who openly accused Papandzeou of deserting the party's basic theses and of turning it toward social-democracy. Thus,

within PASOK there exists today two fronts: that of the well organized Marxists which staffs the party cadres and that of the still unorganized centrist-leftist voters. What unites them is the slogan "change"--a "change," however, which has a different meaning for each faction.

In the event PASOK wins the elections, the Marxists will attempt to implement their program despite the mild positions of Andreas Papandreou. But considering the existing socio-economic giveus in Greece, will Greek society tolerate such a change? It is doubtful if a society which underwent great sufferings from war and political turmoil--yet has attained a stable economic status--will risk its achievements for the sake of radical socio-economic changes of doubtful value. The economic confusion which will result from possible socialistic changes will be very acute and dangerous. Today it is very difficult to transform a capitalist state into a socialist one unless many years have lapsed. Today's displeasure of the people from the continuous 50-year rule by the Right may be very intensive and they may express support for PASOK. This, however, does not mean--that the majority of the Greek people is willing to adopt Marxism. It is very possible that PASOK will accept a social-democracy status. We must not, moreover, forget something else: the Right is well organized and controls the whole state machinery. The executing power is not enough for the Marxists to impose their will. In 1954, Georgios Papandreou was not able to remain in power more than 1 year even though he had [won the elections with] 52 percent of the votes.

How will a possible PASOK victory affect the Cyprus question and the Greek-Turkish relations in general? If we believe the Papandreou campaign promises about abandoning the dogma "Cyprus decides and Greece supports" and about more meaningful support to Cyprus then we should be pleased. But the truth of the matter is somewhat different. Very few applaud the heroic exaltations Papandreou delivers from time to time. On the one hand, the PASOK Marxists do not treat the relations between Greece and Cyprus as those of a mother to daughter and do not favor any Greek intervention in the Cyprist crisis in deference to Turkey. They consider the Cyprus problem as an attack by American imperialism against Greece, Cyprus and Turkey and argue that only the unity of the three peoples in a struggle against the Americans will bring about a solution to the problem. They abhor a war confrontation between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus or over any other issue. They believe that such confrontation will be provoked by the American imperialism in order to sell arms and to increase the dependence of the two countries on it. On the other hand, very few of the PASOK centrist-leftist voters would be disposed to sacrifice their relatively comfortable economic status for either a war confrontation with Turkey or for expanded military aid to Cyprus without exhausting all means for a peaceful solution of the disputes (means which in any case include mutual concessions.)

With such giveus it will be difficult for Papandreou to carry out his intentions much as we believe that he is a sincere man. However, those who believe that if PASOK comes to power the distance between Greece and Turkey will become greater will do well to be more cautious.

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CSO: 4621/102

## INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, POSITIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES ANALYZED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 8 Sep 81 p 3

[Article by D.: "The Lost Opportunities for Cyprus Were Only Traps"]

[Text] The result of the recent parliamentary elections in Cyprus was decisive for the policy to be followed by the Cypriot government in all the aspects of the problem we generally call "the Cypriot question."

AKEL and the [Democratic] Rally came first with, roughly speaking, 30 percent each. Kyprianou's party received 20 percent and Lyssaridis' party 8 percent. AKEL and Rally, in spite of their many disagreements and the tension which characterized their mutual recriminations, agree nevertheless on the major subject, namely, the objectives regarding the Cypriot question. This is clearly evident from a series of statements, communiqus and speeches by the leaders and representatives of the two parties and the views presented by their newspapers. But beyond such conclusions the convergence of views was clearly stated, repeatedly and without equivocation, by the leader of the Democratic Rally during the electoral period. Kliridis, even on TV had said that with regard to the essential aspect of policy on the Cypriot question, AKEL and Rally agree, and that they only have some differences on tactics. The essence of the policy advocated by the two major parties on the Cypriot question is that the bicultural dialogue must continue, that realistic concessions must be made, and that the Greek Cypriots must persuade the Turkish Cypriots that they want to have genuine cooperation with them, to win their trust, and to reestablish bicultural harmony. Both parties downgrade the factor of the Turkish Cypriots total dependence on Ankara. The Rally appears to hope that the power of the Greek Cypriot capital and enterprising spirit will create conditions that will enable the Turkish Cypriots to move away gradually from Turkey. AKEL, on its part, appears to believe that the same result can be achieved with the force of proletarian solidarity which will be restored between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot oppressed people. Class unity will overcome the ethnic differences.... But AKEL possibly overlooks the fact that not even the leftists who are a small minority among the Turkish Cypriots support the return of the refugees and the restoration of the territory to Greek Cypriots. The Rally overlooks the fact that Turkey has an age-long tradition of policies which hold that the Turks should govern and that the minorities, the subject people, should trade and finance Turkey. Both parties close their eyes to the fact that the Turkish Cypriots, even if some of them wanted it, cannot act independently from Turkey which has a declared, immovable and high priority geopolitical interest in Cyprus.

Kyprianou's party, i.e. the party of the president of the Republic and the only executive under the constitution, has much less precise views and is trying to find a balance between militancy and compromise. In other words, Kyprianou is trying to govern by adding to his eight deputies in the 35-seat legislature, the support of the AKEL 12 deputies. This is because [Kyprianou], the leader of the Democratic Party, cannot expect such support from the Rally which not only has the same views as AKEL, but whose leader, in addition, claims the presidency of the Republic from Kyprianou.

Lyssaridis' party is more consistent in the militant line. Without change for years now, it argues that the way the bicultural dialogue is conducted harms the Greek Cypriot cause and results to the benefit of the Turkish side. It is the only party that has clearly opposed any further concessions and the process of the bicultural dialogue. But Lyssaridis has only three deputies.

If this, indeed, is the political reality in Cyprus one may reasonably ask how is it possible for Cyprus to chart a policy of militant expectation in view of this balance of political prices. In other words, since the parties and public opinion, in the majority, appear to insist on the process of bicultural talks and on additional concessions of undefined and varying extent, who is in a position to support a believable policy of militancy?

If that were the case, given and unchangeable, then the prospects for the Greek Cypriots and by extension for all Greeks would be dismal. But we hope, we believe, that such is not the case because it would be a very static approach to the Cypriot reality.

The public opinion is not mummified. It is a dynamic phenomenon, sensitive to changing conditions and the influence of leaders; it is restructured and reformulated. More specifically in Cyprus but also in Greece the people, uninformed on the true essence of the Cypriot question, are beset with illusion cultivated with slogans and deceit.

For seven years now, the Greeks in Cyprus and in Greece hear that the Turks are ready for a reasonable compromise. Every year the promises peak during the "summer ritual" when, prior to the [UN] General Assembly, plans for solution, promises about forthcoming concessions, myths about lost opportunities that should not be lost again and many other similar tranquilizers are offered creating in the public opinion the erroneous expectation for an honorable compromise with Turkey. In this way the architects of this process, in and out of Cyprus, succeed in toning down the agony of the public opinion and create the impression among some that the people are getting tired and are ready to accept almost any compromise.

But the people are not tired. Simply they do not know. They were not told the truth. If they knew, they would lash out to punish those who deceive them, undaunted fighters for national and physical survival.

How could the people come out of the dark? They do not know that there never were lost opportunities and therefore there is no reason to rush now lest another opportunity is lost. For the past seven years the people were never shown a solution which, based on the criteria of their national and physical survival, might be

regarded as an improvement of the present reality. If Turkey had something positive to offer, it would have done so in the first few months after the invasion when Archbishop Makarios was in London and Cyprus was governed by the leader of the Democratic Rally who seems to have the thrust of the West and to be tolerated by Turkey. Turkey would have made an offer to Kliridis in which case Makarios would not have returned and the new state would have been able to function. But Turkey did not make an offer, nor did it make one in the next seven years. And if there is still some impression that some opportunities were lost, such an impression should have been dispelled by now with the latest Turkish Cypriot proposals which are not only without substance but actually constitute a mockery for the Greek Cypriots.

Under present conditions, Turkey has nothing to offer. Simply because it is absolutely necessary for its geopolitical objectives to retain the territory it is occupying in Cyprus and it is even more necessary to achieve an equal, undivided condominium over the entire island under the guise of a federal state. All this farce of periodically presented plans and ideas is designed primarily to mislead public opinion and to hypnotize the Greek people in Greece and Cyprus. These were simply a series of traps. There have been no lost opportunities for the Greeks. Only wasted traps by the Turks and their supporters. It would be fortunate for the Greeks if some more such "opportunities" were lost.

But in addition to the myth of lost opportunities, we also have the scare tactics of double Enosis, the definite partition, that is, of Cyprus--in order to cultivate among the people the acceptance of compromises. These scare tactics are revived and intensified any time it is revealed that the Turks have nothing to propose. This is one way to disorient the disappointment of the public.

It is also argued that this continuation solidifies the present unacceptable situation. This is correct. However, the solutions offered do not lead to the demolition but to the legitimization of what has been done and to the worsening of the situation. The only way to avert the freezing of the situation is to keep it warm with active, imaginative and above all annoying activity for the Turks and their supporters as well as with continuous reminders of the pending issue. Militant waiting.

How is it possible for the people not to be in the dark?

Recently, on 5 August, the Turks submitted their notorious proposals. The National Council of Cyprus found them unacceptable. Nevertheless the dialogue is continuing. But where will it lead since the proposals are unacceptable? However, we must exhaust all possibilities; to show our good faith. They would be at least naive if they really believed that the 80 percent of the Cypriot people show bad faith only because they demand that the remaining 18 percent should be limited to rights commensurate with their numerical strength and because they demand that the Turkish army evacuate the 39 percent of the island. Let us understand, once and for all, that the third interested parties are aware of our good faith. They also know the bad faith of the Turks. But they do not care about such things. The only thing they take into account is who can annoy and pressure them the most. They care about nothing else. But, maybe, if we continue the talks we may make some progress. How is this possible? Maybe, the Turks for negotiating reasons

have not shown yet their last card. Maybe, if the Greek Cypriots submit counter-proposals they will give the Turks the opportunity to improve their proposals? By 20, 30, 50 or 100 percent? That is, will they increase the 3 percent of the Cypriot territory they propose to return to 4, 5, 6 percent? And will they keep in the end the 33 percent? And will they let 40 instead of 30,000 refugees to return to their homes? And as far as the constitution is concerned what are they to offer since they are not going to negotiate the basic principles of condominium which is the essence of their policy? It is time for all of us to understand that we cannot expect any essential improvement of the Turkish Cypriot proposals. No significant concession. Moreover, by continuing the dialogue under these conditions we give the detrimental impression that in reality we would be prepared to accept a solution provided the Turks were willing to improve somewhat their proposals. Maybe, some people, very few, really want this but dare not say it because they fear the people's wrath. The deceit is more convenient than the truth.

For God's sake what forces determine the fate of Cypriot Hellenism?

To enlighten public opinion and to have an active expression of its concern, it is important to have a [favorable] Greek government policy. Because, no doubt, Cyprus alone cannot shoulder the weight of such a struggle. Following the [fall of the junta and the] restoration of democracy, the Greek government enunciated the dogma "Cyprus decides, Greece supports." This dogma reassured all Greeks and especially the Cypriots who had suffered the tragic consequences of the dictatorship's cruelty. At the same time this policy strengthened the prestige of the sovereign Cypriot state, a precious support for the success of the struggle. At the same time [this policy] removed any pressures from the Greek government.

This policy was and continues to be sound provided it does not become--if this has not already started--a cover-up for indifference and a subterfuge for Greece's dis-association with its historic responsibility not only to actively support Cyprus but to advise and to follow a policy which will at least preserve the people's fighting spirit and keep the issue internationally open, since nothing else appears feasible at this time. Under these conditions the role of the president of the Republic is difficult, precisely because there is now a problem of balance in view of the way the political forces in Cyprus have developed. A hint is delicately expressed in Kyprianou's speech at Astromeritis on 16 August. Said the president:

"...This..." (i.e., the way the Cypriot government reacted to the latest Turkish Cypriot proposals) "is something demanded by the national interest from whatever vantage point that interest may be viewed; either local or international."

In other words there are conditions in Cyprus which result not only from international but from domestic factors as well. But the latter may change provided the people understand that the primary problem is the Cypriot question and provided they are properly informed on the real facts. If such an effort is undertaken, conditions will develop which will allow a policy of militant waiting.

A public opinion will be actively developed--a public spirit which will surprise many who believe, either out of ignorance or because they find it convenient, that the possibilities the Cypriot Hellenism has for fighting are exhausted.

In a year and a half the new president of the Republic of Cyprus will be elected. Until then nothing should be done that might tie down the people's future. On the contrary all must engage in a crusade of enlightenment to help the people understand what is at stake and what real possibilities exist.

Will the president of the Republic be able, going beyond the leadership of the two parties and aiming at the rank-and-file to carry out a two-front struggle of enlightenment in order to win the majority of the people in favor of a policy of militant waiting? He has the intelligence and the experience. The recent electoral campaign affirmed that he has also the strong will. Will he be able to mobilize all these possibilities and utilize the virtues of Cypriot Hellenism in order to win his own majority without crutches so that he can implement such policy? If he is successful he will have offered a colossal service to Cypriot Hellenism.

Be that as it may, it is a historic necessity that, at last, some leader is found who will be able to express again validly the unwavering militant spirit of Cypriot Hellenism; its agony for physical and national survival.

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## POLL SHOWS DROP IN SPD SUPPORT, RISE OF GREEN PARTY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 15 Sep 81 p 3

[Article by Fk.: "A Low for Social Democrats"]

[Text] A demoscopic rechecking of voter opinions of the parties one year after the Bundestag elections of 5 October 1980 produces a changed picture. Many recent tactical moves or strategic decisions are only meaningful against the background of these figures--which are constantly at the disposal of party leaderships so that they can act accordingly.

The graph reproduces the results of the so-called "Sunday question" ("If another Bundestag election were held next Sunday: For which party would you vote?") by the Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy for the last 15 months. Two developments deserve special attention: the strong decline in the popularity of the Social Democrats and the rise of the "Greens." According to the results of the most recent poll, the possibility exists that the "Greens" may be able to rise above the 5-percent minimum throughout the FRG, something which they have to date only been able to accomplish in three FRG Laender (Bremen, Baden-Wuerttemberg and Berlin). The protest potential is growing and apparently it is growing at the expense of the Social Democrats. The loss of votes since the last election is more than 7 percent--that is no trifle, even though parties in power have always had difficulties maintaining the election results during the period following the election.


The Social Democrats experienced the same thing during the Bundestag elections of 1976, when they received 46.2 percent of the votes (In 1980 it was 42.9 percent). The following year, responses to the Allensbach "Sunday question" indicated a temporary drop to 37 percent. At that time, however, the Social Democrats were able to recover relatively fast and rise to values between 39 and 42 percent. This time, however, although the decline is not any worse, it is apparently more persistent. The general mood also provides little hope that the trend will change in the near future. For months opinion-poll results for the SPD have stabilized near 35 percent--the May result of 33.6 percent (see graph) is an insignificant "deviation" on the low side, something that happens occasionally during poll taking. Nevertheless, a continuing deterioration cannot be discounted with respect to the regular SPD voters--the "needed minimum level" of the SPD, which is estimated at between 30 and 33 percent.

The available opinion-poll results do not give any clue about the inner mechanics of movement between the parties by those questioned; only results of the movements are noticeable. Accordingly, more or less in keeping with everyday personal experiences, a considerable percentage of the increase for the "Greens" is primarily at the expense of the SPD. The Free Democrats have remained almost untouched by this trend. For a year their support has been somewhere between 9 and 11 percent, remarkably close to the Bundestag election results of 10.6 percent. The latest figures are the result of an Allensbach opinion poll conducted between 13 and 21 August. This means that the internal disputes within the coalition about the budget--reaching a climax during the first 10 days of September--are not yet reflected in these results. Compared to the last election period, the FDP has been able to increase the number of its supporters significantly; at that time it was fluctuating between 6 and 8 percent.

The Union parties have regained their position of 1975-78, as far as voter preference is concerned, in other words, between 48 and 50 percent voted in their favor. In the meantime, the continuing decline in voter preference which dropped to 44.5 percent in the 1980 Bundestag election (in 1976 they received 48.6 percent) has at least demoscopically been reversed. The decline of the Union began as early as 1978, which was at least 6 months before Strauss was nominated as a candidate for the chancellorship; this event interrupted the trend briefly, but later, above all in 1980, it even accelerated. Today it is ahead of the coalition by almost 4 percentage points; it corresponds to the standings of 1977-78. Beginning with 1979 the coalition was consistently ahead of the Union by 3 to 4 percentage points until the Bundestag election.

The "Greens" are currently the fourth party, but they are of a totally different color than Strauss wanted but which he had always visualized as a prerequisite for a change in the majority relationships in Bonn. If they should be able to get above the 5-percent minimum during the next Bundestag election--today's prospects for this do not look bad at all--the SPD/FDP could only survive by forming an alliance with them (as has already happened in a few cities). If, however, the "Greens" remain below the 5-percent minimum, the coalition--the way things look today--will become a minority. The computed absolute majority in the Bundestag would then be reduced to between 47.5 and 48 percent, because between 4 and 5 percent of the valid votes would not be taken into consideration. Anyway, measured by historical standards (1976), the Union should be able to get that many votes. Of course: It entails many unknown factors and a future that is still 3 years away.

## (1) Die Parteien in der Wählergunst



Key:

1. The Parties and Voter Preference
2. If Bundestag elections were held next Sunday, for which party would you vote?
3. "Greens"
4. Bundestag election on 5 October (second-vote election result)
5. Source: Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy

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CSO: 3103/439

## TEN POLITICAL PARTIES COMPETING IN ELECTIONS

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek No 684, 10-16 Sep 81 pp 19-21

[Text] Ten parties that may be reduced to nine or eight in view of cooperation talks or to eleven, depending on splits, put their "cards" on the table for the people last weekend undaunted by the polarization avalanche. But it is not difficult to detect that the seven out of those ten parties are "motivated" by the fear of extinction. The Greek voter understands the effort of the small parties, comprehends the effect of polarization on the fate of democracy, but...but he is gradually taken over by fanaticism and day by day joins more and more the polarization dance. Sober and wise people are drawn away by the centrifugal forces, embrace extreme slogans and join in activities which do not reflect their psychological make-up.

The panic of the "wasted vote" puts its seal on our political life now more than ever. For this reason, seven out of 10 voters complain about the polarization, call for simple representation [electroal system] as a way out and denounce the single party government.

Be that as it may, the first major political event of the week was PASOK's large gathering in Patrai and (Papandreu's) strong speech followed by the immediate reactions of the government camp. All agree that the gathering in Patrai was large. The difference among those estimating its size is mostly on the origin of the participants. The New Democracy circles argue that it was a gathering of followers from half the country. PASOK argues that "it was an avalanche that starts from the capital of Peloponnisos to wipe out the Right throughout Greece." To the Papandreu charges about scandals, Rallis warned that "if [Papandreu] insists on following this road...it is not me who will regret it." For the moment the altercations stopped there. But the next 40 days are expected to be harsh and tense.

The Papandreu speech in Patrai, the first formal electoral speech in this campaign, was strong and harsh against the government, while the ND circles called it a slogan-ridden speech.

In opening his speech, Papandreu explained why he opened his campaign in Patrai instead of in Thessaloniki like the old leaders of the center parties.

"It is natural for me to launch the final and victorious phase of this campaign for power from my home town. I am united with you both in family and political background...." He then defined the forces which support PASOK in its struggle for change:

"The fighters of national resistance; those who joined the ranks of the two irreconcilable struggles under the leadership of the great son of Akhaia, Georgios Papandreu; and the heroic fighters of the Polytechnic School generation."

Then he passed on to PASOK's basic ideological goals:

"We promise to build a New Greece, a proud and independent fatherland, a society without anxiety, oppression, and exploitation, a society centered on the human being. This is why we stress that without popular participation democracy is not completed, that socialism has no meaning without respecting human values."

He then defined his main goal:

"Our country's Right--always the standard-bearer of the interests of the establishment and the economic oligarchy--has trampled on human values and did not hesitate to abolish the democratic institutions when it thought that its monopoly of power was threatened. This is why the first and principal target for our people in the coming election is to crush the Right--to push it to the sidelines of history."

On PASOK's relations with the other opposition parties [he said]:

"For PASOK, the struggle of progressive democratic forces, the struggle for change is one-sided directed against the Right. As we underlined, PASOK does not downgrade nor does it ignore the role of other democratic parties participating in the struggle for change. But we must say again that PASOK is set by fate to lead the popular movement toward victory and change."

"A Sinful Past"

From this point he moved on to a very harsh criticism of the past:

"The people remember the wounds the Right inflicted on democracy: the violence and fraud by [Gen.] Dovas, the royal coup of 1965, the foreign-dominated dictatorship of April [1967] the division between nationally-minded citizens and those not, the violation of the citizen's inalienable rights. Our people know the effects of the dependence and subjugation policy always practiced by the Right. The Right is historically to blame for the tragedy of Cyprus. The Right is historically to blame for the various "arrangements" concerning the Aegean airspace--all favoring the Turkish military forces. The Right is historically responsible for Greece's return to NATO's military wing in the context of an agreement which questions the operational responsibility of our air force in the Aegean airspace."

[Papandreu] accused ND of "scare tactics":

"With its scare tactics ND tries to distort history and deform reality. That's where desperation and panic has lead it. It is ND that is in danger--not private

"initiative. It is the domestic and foreign oligarchy that is in danger of losing its privileges--the oligarchy that directs the policies of the Right and steals the toil and sweat of the Greek people."

"Who is Responsible?"

After speaking on several other issues in his lengthy speech, [Papandreu] posed to the government a series of questions on economic mismanagement and scandals:

"1. Who is responsible for the rampant inflation which ranges for the third year around 25 percent?

"2. Who is responsible for the rapid and dangerous devaluation of the drachma, a fact which not only pushes inflation up but also shrinks our true national income?

"3. Who created the tremendous deficit—300 billion drachmas in 1981--in the public sector?

"4. Who is responsible for handling the foreign exchange reserve--which cost our country a loss of over 350 million dollars?

"5. Who is responsible for a policy of incentives and credits, which threatens the medium-small business with extinction and led several large enterprises to bankruptcy?

"6. Why the only enterprises flourishing in our country are the multinationals? Who is responsible for granting privileges to foreign firms at the expense of Greek enterprises?

"7. Who, in the end, is responsible for the de-hellenization of our industry?

"8. How were distributed and what happened to the scandalous grants? Why are the industrialists prosperous while the enterprises are bankrupt?"

G. Rallis: "I Warn You"

Rallis was the first to answer Papandreu's speech:

"The PASOK chairman in a recent statement had said that the electoral campaign should be carried out with good manners, democratic ethos, and the contest of arguments. In his first electoral speech in Patrai he proved his 'inconsistency': to his demagoguery he has now added mudslinging. He has forgotten that when two months he had again spoken of scandals I challenged him to come to the Chamber of Deputies and there, with full TV coverage, expose all he says he knows. He refused to respond to this challenge....

"I warn him for the last time that if he insists on following this road, I have no objection, but he should know that it is not me that will regret it."

Later, a government spokesman, speaking at length said on the relationship between PASOK and other parties: "In the speech there is a triumphant declaration that PASOK's struggle is 'one-sided'; that PASOK walks hand in hand in this campaign with the other opposition parties including KKE. We are facing in other words a Marxist Popular Front advocating the slogans 'Out of NATO,' 'Out of the EEC.' This is the political meaning of the speech in Patrai. This is Papandreu's 'Socialism.'"

#### "He Extolls Crimes"

On the past of the governmental camp:

"Papandreu's speech also includes a mention of the period of the National Liberation Front [EAM] rule, the street demonstrations of 1966-67 which undermined the democratic institutions and made things easier for those who ended democracy.

PASOK which does not only condemn the communist crimes of the past but instead extolls the communist resistance "has a sinful past and a nonexistent future." The governmental camp which Papandreu attacks with such vehemence is proud of its past and its present creative accomplishments, but it is also sure of its future.

PASOK with the theses it advocates shows itself to be a marginal movement; it has been a marginal movement from its inception—with the declaration of 3 September 1974, which Papandreu now conveniently ignores."

On the dictatorship:

"There is mention of the resistance struggle against the dictatorship. It is conveniently forgotten, in a sad manner, that a multitude of specific ND cadres and especially the premier played a leading part in that struggle."

On economic questions:

"The minority leader continues his tactic of distorting the economic data. For example, he blames ND for the international rise in the value of the dollar, which he deliberately presents as a devaluation of the drachma. He knows, too, that inflation is due not only to the rise in the world prices of raw materials but also to the rise in wages and in the prices of agricultural products. What does, then, Papandreu want? Not to increase wages and salaries or the prices of agricultural products? Is this the way he cares about the "non-privileged Greeks"?

#### "When the Poles Are Hungry"

"Papandreu also knows that the deficits of the public sector are due to the holding down of the prices and rates charged by many public utilities and public enterprises (for example, bus fares, hospital rates, etc.) for social and other reasons, the realization of investments for the country's economic development and the nation's defense. What does Papandreu want? To have the Greek people pay more, to have massive firings of employees, not to have investments, or to weaken the country's defense capabilities?"

The government spokesman added:

"The Greek people have judgment and memory. They see the difference between their standard of living today compared to 1974 in spite of the economic difficulties in the world. They know the deprivations of the Polish people and the extensive unemployment in most other countries, know the benefits from our equal participation in the EEC, benefits which will increase in the near future. The Greek people know on the other hand that PASOK's policies weaken Greece vis-a-vis Turkey. They see the non-aligned states Papandreu wants us to join, being affected with wars and catastrophes. For this reason, in the coming election, the Greek people will vote for ND to secure the democratic system, their economic achievements, the tranquility, peace, and security to continue their course toward progress and prosperity."

Florakis: Explanations

In an interview given to ELEVTHEROTYPIA Kh. Florakis explained the KKE theses on certain key points:

- a. It is not enough to say that "the Right must be removed from office." This slogan must include "to bring about the change." Otherwise, according to Florakis, the situation may end with a mere change of personalities in government. He added that this point is the source of KEE's theses and its constructive criticism of other democratic forces on the question of what kind of change the country needs (question of NATO, bases, democratization, etc.) and how to consolidate [the change]; that is, the need for common action by the forces of change instead of the thesis and logic of "self-sufficiency."
- b. The meaning of socialization has become imprecise "due to misuse." It does not mean the nationalizations done by the Right which in the last analysis helps the monopolies. It is not the case of the monopolies which unload to the state their bankrupt enterprises. Neither is it a simple transformation into shares of the loans given by the banks to monopoly enterprises. Neither is it a worker participation in management, which is painless for the monopolies.

Socialization concerns the abolition of large capitalistic property, of the production and exchange means and of planned management for the benefit of the whole society. This will be implemented by socialism.

- c. A strong KKE in the Chamber of Deputies will contribute to the establishment of a strong democratic government based on all forces of change and will have a decisive influence on the development and orientation of the popular movement.... Common points of agreement will be found among the forces of change for the implementation of a minimum program....

The EDIK Ticket

No sooner were the fermentations in the area of the Center over than Zygdis made public the names of his party's candidates in Athens and some provincial cities. The first candidates of the Democratic Center Union [EDIK] belong to all social

strata with the professionals leading. At the same time [EDIK leader] Zygdis continued his charges about the polarization created by the electoral law and held the government accountable for the anticipated political anomalies. In the past seven days he did not hold a political rally.

#### Mavros: Simple Proportional System

Ignoring the merging of the Party of Democratic Socialism [KODISO] with the Agrarian and Workers Party [KAE], Mavros called on the forces of the Center to unite "because never before had the country a need of the Center than today...."

Mavros pointed out that the Center's objectives are the same as those of all opposition parties. "In this regard," he said, "our struggle is a two-front struggle nor a multi-front one. Its main objective will be to remove from power the party responsible for the present crisis."

Speaking also on behalf of N. Venizelos and Deputy Xylouras he charged ND with leading the country to this crisis by deliberately creating the polarization [of the political forces]. He declared in favor of the simple proportional [electoral system] which he considers as the only way for the normalization of the situation. He finally pointed out that to solve the problems the country faces it is necessary to adopt institutional measures which only a government of a broader spectrum can take and implement. For this reason one of the two large parties will not be able to govern even if it is able to form an independent government. The time of one-party, independent governments is gone." [Translator's note: Mavros has, since making this statement, joined PASOK.]

#### Kyrkos: Cooperation

Kyrkos characterized the cooperation of the forces for change as a "good sign." He defined the axis of cooperation roughly as follows:

1. A comprehensive Greek policy, independent of any centers of power.
2. A policy of broadening the individual and public freedoms, the autonomy of massive movements and the participation of the working people in the decision-making process.
3. An economic and social policy having as criterion to maximize the social benefit and not the private profit.

#### Pezmazoglou: The Worst Monopoly

KODISO Chairman I. Pesmazoglou, speaking on behalf of the Democratic Unity during an open rally in Larisa last Sunday--after a greeting by Al. Baltazis of the Agrarian and Workers Party--said, in part:

"Hard experience in this country proved that the one-party governments do not solve but complicate problems and create a power monopoly which is the worst of all monopolies.

"KODISO and the Agrarian and Workers Party [KAE] are participating in this election as an independent force which is not a satellite of anyone. We are struggling against the reactionary forces with our own notion about change, with our own clear program, with steadiness and responsibility without retractions and inconsistencies."

#### National Array-Markezinis

The situation in the area of the extreme Right is outlined as follows:

1. First of all Korydallos [prison where the junta leaders are held] refuses again, according to various reports, to endorse any of the parties but recommends that ND be voted out.
2. The National Array, represented by S. Theotokis and cadres Georgalas, Farmakis and others, announced that it will have candidates throughout Greece except Crete. Theotokis said that following the election ND may cede part of its power to the communist front and rejected the proposal for New Democracy-National Array cooperation on an equal basis. He said that Markezinis does not believe ideologically in a kingdom and that while he himself [Pesmazoglou] has no respect at all for Karamanlis, Markezinis does hold such respect for the man. The National Array does not raise any questions on the political system even though it considers the 1974 election "dishonest" and "rigged." "We and the king," he said, "believe that without the people's verdict following an irreproachable plebiscite he [the king] should not return." Finally, he declared that he is for the "liberation" of the April [1967] juntists and said that he is committed to bring about its realization. [Translator's note: Theotokis has recently announced that his party will not participate in the elections.]
3. Markezinis whose party will participate in the elections independently has followed a separate line since last Sunday. In an interview he gave to ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS he pointed out that the dangermongering aims at coercing the people's vote. The vote given to ND will be a wasted vote. Greece will soon find itself in an economic deadlock. His Progressive party will give battle for the middle class which is suffering most. The imprisoned juntists must be freed.

A government official reacting to these statements said: "ND has ruled out any cooperation with any party. At the same time it refused to include Marxists, Marxism followers, socialists, and fascists in its lists of candidates."

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## ND ANNOUNCES COMPLETE LIST OF CANDIDATES

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 18 Sep 81 p 5

[Text] After a series of deliberations by the designated committee and after careful consideration of the recommendations of the committees of the Nomes, "New Democracy" made public yesterday its lists of candidates for the entire country.

The ND lists are as follows:

First Athens District

Rallis Georgios of Ioannis.

Anagnostopoulos Nikolaos of Dimitrios, former deputy, civil engineer.

Anapliotis Artemios of Evangelos, attorney, councilman City of Athens.

Apostolatos Gerasimos of Konstandinos, former deputy minister, economist.

Vasilatos Vasileios of Gerasimos, attorney-sociologist.

Vergi Sofia-Roza of Nikolaos, member of the executive committee of the ONNED [Youth Organization of the New Democracy].

Devletoglou Evangelos of Athanasios, former minister, economist.

Evert Miltiadis of Angelos, minister economist.

Zouvelos Mikhail of Stefanos, former military judge, attorney.

Karathanasis Khristos of Ioannis, former chief of Cities Police.

Makropoulos Akhilleas of Konstandinos, economist, businessman.

Manos Stefanos of Alexandros, minister, mechanical engineer, businessman.

Xanthakis Alexandros of Georgios, attorney.

Papadongonas Alexandros of Dionysios, former minister, retired naval officer.

Plytas Georgios of Amvrosios, minister, insurance underwriter.

Revmatas Makis of Nikolaos, actor.

Sapsalis Konstandinos of Georgios, former deputy, former secretary general of the Ministry of Public Order, attorney.

Stefanakis Konstandinos of Georgios, former minister, former director of EKTE [National Land Bank of Greece], attorney.

Synodinou Anna, former deputy minister, actress.

Tzanetakis Tzannis of Petros, minister, retired naval officer.

Fikioris Ioannis of Vasileios, minister, attorney.

#### Second Athens District

Athanitis Khristos of Nikolaos, former deputy, attorney.

Apostolakos Khristos of Ioannis, former minister.

Vrettakos Dimitrios of Leonidas, former deputy, former director general of the King Paul National Foundation, attorney.

Davakis Ioannis of Dikaios, former deputy, pediatrician.

Dalakouras Georgios of Dimitrios, deputy, shipowner.

Kakogiannakos Konstandinos of Dimitrios, attorney.

Kamboulakis Nikolaos of Spyros, physician.

Karaiskakis Dimitrios of Andreas, former deputy minister, chemical engineer, member of the Administrative Committee of the ND.

Karatzas Kharis of Theofanis, former deputy minister, attorney.

Koutifari Lina, former deputy minister, physician.

Kratsas Apostolos of Georgios, deputy, mechanical and electrical engineer.

Krikos Athanasios of Ioannis, deputy, attorney.

Laskaris Kostandinos of Georgios, minister, attorney.

Markou Miltiadis of Nikolaos, retired officer.

Mikropoulos Nikolaos of Alexandros, civil engineer.

Mbernitsas Panagiotis of Ioannis, economist.

Papadakis Stylianos of Stavros, former deputy, businessman.

Papathanasiou Athanasios of Andonios, industrialist, former mayor of Nea Smyrni.

Paparrigopoulos Konstandinos of Ioannis, deputy minister, attorney.

Papakonstandinou Georgios of Konstandinos, deputy, attorney.

Polidoros Vyron of Georgios, member of the Administrative Committee of ND, attorney.

Sfyris Dimitrios of Panagiotis, attorney.

Tsaldaris Athanasios of Konstandinos, deputy minister, attorney.

Tsoukandas Athanasios of Georgios, deputy minister, physician.

Foufas Zisis of Georgios, former secretary general of the Ministry of Social Services, attorney.

Fyssas Christos of Ioannis, deputy, attorney.

Psilos Diomidis of Dimitrios, former deputy, economist, university professor.

#### Aitolokarnania Nome

Delimitsos Panagiotis of Vasileios, attorney.

Livanos Dionysios of Spyridon, former deputy, former secretary general of the Ministry of Communications, economist.

Manginas Kharilaos of S., attorney.

Palkogiannis Dimitrios of Sokratis, public relations counsel.

Papaioannou Nikolaos of Georgios, deputy, attorney.

Stamatis Georgios of Dimitrios, former minister, attorney.

Stratos Khristoforos of Stamatios, former minister, industrialist.

Fotopoulos Khristos of Fotios, deputy, retired officer.

Khoutas Thomas of Stylianos, attorney, secretary general of the Ministry of Social Services.

Argolis Nome

Kapetanopoulos Vasileios of Konstandinos, attorney, economist.

Kleiosis Nikolaos, retired Vice Admiral, Coast Guard.

Moutzouridis Georgios of Ioannis, attorney.

Sotiropoulos Vasileios of Nikolaos, physician.

Arkadia Nome

Aposkitis Konstandinos of Leonidas, former deputy minister, philologist.

Efthimiou Ioannis of Nikolaos, physician.

Kalteziotis Nikolaos of Konstandinos, former deputy minister, civil engineer.

Mandzoris Vasileios of Konstandinos, deputy, attorney.

Tsingounis Dimitrios of Alexandros, president of ONNED [Youth Organization of the New Democracy].

Arta Nome

Vagias Panagiotis of Kharilaos, agriculturist.

Kontaxis Athanasios of Dimitrios, deputy, attorney.

Papadimitriou Eleftheros of Konstandinos, attorney.

Rizos Dimitrios of Khristos former deputy, attorney.

Attiki Nome (Remainder)

Kakaris Christos of Andonios, deputy, businessman.

Katsigiannis Christos of Athanasios, deputy, civil engineer.

Mikhail Lazaros of Panagiotis, deputy minister, attorney.

Mbotsis Georgios, retired officer Cities Police.

Papagiannis Mikhail of Kanellos, former deputy, civil engineer.

Papakonstandinou Athanasios of K., attorney.

Stamolekas Nikolaos, former secretary general of the Ministry of Labor, attorney.

Frangos Dimitrios of Anastasios, deputy, attorney.

Akhaia Nome

Argyropoulos Konstandinos of Dionysios, attorney.

Goudas Konstandinos of Leonidas, university professor.

Zaimis Andreas of Fokion, deputy minister, attorney.

Kosseris Khrysostomos of Vasileios, economist.

Malevitis Ilias of Ioannis, attorney.

Mbekiris Vasileios of Mikhail, deputy, attorney.

Patronis Nikolaos of Georgios, deputy, attorney.

Petropoulos Konstandinos of Kharilaos, attorney.

Stefanopoulos Konstandinos of Dimitrios, minister, attorney.

Khlicheros Alexios of Theodosios, attorney.

Voiotia Nome

Vourdoumbas Georgios of Dimitrios, attorney.

Gamvroulis Komninos of Th., pediatrician.

Ktistakis Nikolaos of Ioannita, deputy, attorney.

Makrygenis Mikhail of Georgios, attorney.

Papaspyrou Dimitrios of G., president of the Chamber of Deputies.

Tsiplakos Aristeidis of Ioannis, civil engineer, former secretary general of the Ministry of Public Works.

Grevena Nome

Krikelis Anastasios of Thomas, attorney.

Makris Mikhail of Ioannis, deputy, attorney.

Drama Nome

Grivas Dimitrios of Theologos, deputy, retired officer.

Takhyridis Athanasios of Leonidas, deputy, civil engineer.

Dodekanisos Nome

Zannis Pavlos of Emmanouil, electro-mechanical engineer of the EMP [Greek Metsovion Polytechnic School].

Karamarios Anastasios of Emmanouil, attorney.

Papakostas Vasileios of Georgios, attorney, former Nome governor.

Pavlidis Aristotelis of Andonios, deputy, physicist.

Tavlarios Ippokratis of Drosos, deputy, merchant.

Khatziandoniadis Andonios of Minas, physician.

Evros Nome

Kavaratzis Ioannis of St., former deputy, physician, member of the Administrative Committee.

Klis Panagiotis of Theodosios, former minister, deputy, physician.

Tataridis Stavros of Dimitrios, former deputy minister, civil engineer.

Katzinikolaou Panagiotis of M., deputy, dentist.

Evvoia Nome

Vlakhothanasis Angelis of Dimitrios, former deputy, attorney.

Vogiatzis Georgios of Per., former minister, civil engineer.

Kakaras Mikhail of Andonios, deputy.

Mikhailakis Aristeidis of Th., former deputy, attorney, president of ODIE [no extension available].

Papanikolaou Nikolaos of Ioannis.

Stefanidis Konstandinos of Stefanos, professor of technical schools.

Evrytania Nome

Karapiperis Khrysostomos of P., former deputy minister, professor [PhD] of the Khalkis Theological School.

Mbouras Dimitrios of Konstandinos, attorney.

Zakynthos Nome

Giannoulis Dionysios of Khar., industrialist.

Margaris Ioannis of Nikolaos, deputy, attorney.

Ileia Nome

Kanelopoulos Athanasios of P., minister, economist.

Karakhalios Tryfon of Evstathios, retired Air Force officer, former Nome governor.

Kontogiannopoulos Vasileios of Nikolaos, former deputy minister, attorney.

Mbountouvis Akhilleas of B., deputy, economic consultant.

Papandreou Andreas of Leonidas, attorney.

Pipilis Khristos of Menelaos, deputy, agriculturist.

Spentzari-Tsiamani Froso, pharmacist, member of the Administrative Committee of the Party.

#### First Salonica District

Voudouris Dimitrios of Panagiotis, deputy minister, attorney.

Vlakhaki-Miliara Polyxeni, wife of Emmanouil, merchant.

Gogousis Vlasis of A., physician.

Zarndinidis Nikolaos of Vasileios, former minister, businessman.

Katsaounis Aristeidis of Athanasios, former deputy minister, attorney.

Kouvelas Sotirios, civil engineer, president of the Technical Chamber of Northern Greece.

Lazaridis Ioannis of Savvas, landowner-businessman.

Mattheoudakis Georgios of Ioannis, deputy, attorney.

Moutsios Georgios, of Athanasios, former deputy minister, attorney.

Mbakatselos Georgios of Dimitrios, former minister, attorney.

Mbokovos Panagiotis of Paraskevas, former deputy minister, economist.

Papageorgopoulos Vasileios of N., dentist.

Sfendonis Ioannis of Nikolaos, architect.

#### Second Salonica District

Aidonas Apostolos of Georgios, former deputy, attorney.

Vardakas Mikhail of Ioannis, deputy, attorney.

Glastras Vasileios of Georgios, attorney.

Grigoriadis Apollon of Theodoros, attorney.

Ermeidis Kharis of Panagiotis, deputy, dentist.

Koskinas Khristos of Onoufrios, former president of OLTH [Salonica Port Authority], agronomist, topographer.

Koutras Panagiotis of Dimitrios, deputy, attorney.

Salangoudis Georgios of Aristotelis, chemist.

Tzitzikostas Georgios of A., former deputy minister, attorney.

#### Thesprotia Nome

Vezorevanis Ilias of Konstandinos, journalist.

Pitoulis Fotios of Thomas, deputy, attorney.

Stroungaris Andreas of Eleftherios, attorney.

#### Imathia Nome

Valtadoros Angelos of Dimitrios, attorney, former secretary general of the Ministry of Northern Greece.

Dimoulis Ioannis of Stergios, attorney.

Zamanis Dimitrios of Stergios, civil engineer-partner of a corporation.

Iakovidis Arkhelaos of G., deputy, agriculturist, businessman.

Miltsanidis Nikolaos of Georgios, attorney.

Khatzidimitriou Dimitrios of Thomas, deputy, attorney.

#### Irakleion Nome

Galenianos Mikhail of Emmanouil, deputy, attorney.

Deligiannakis Emmanouil of Nikolaos, economist.

Kefalogiannis Emmanouil of Vasileios, former minister, attorney.

Koniotakis Konstandinos of Emmanouil, former deputy, retired Air Force General  
Meimarakis Ioannis of Evangelos, attorney.

Ioannina Nome

Averof-Tositsas Evangelos, deputy prime minister.

Ioannou Christos of Nikolaos, deputy, attorney.

Kalogiannis Eleftherios of St., former deputy, businessman.

Loras Anestis of Leonidas, former deputy, attorney.

Panouris Panagiotis of St., deputy, attorney.

Pappas Georgios, heart surgeon.

Kavala Nome

Andoniadis Markos of Georgios, deputy, physician.

Asteriadis Georgios of I., former deputy.

Venetis Konstandinos of Sotirios, former deputy, retired Colonel.

Martis Nikolaos of Konstandinos, minister, attorney.

Panagiotopoulos Georgios of Nikolaos, minister, attorney.

Topalidis Dimitrios of Georgios, legal specialist.

Karditsa Nome

Allamanis Stelios of Akhilleas, former minister, member of the Administrative Committee, attorney.

Anagnostopoulos Theodoros of Georgios, former deputy, attorney.

Thanopoulos Athanasios of Dimitrios, attorney.

Mballas Themistoklis of Markos, deputy, attorney.

Papaevthymiou Georgios of Vasileios, deputy, attorney.

Sioufas Dimitrios of Georgios, attorney.

Taliadouros Athanasios of Spyridon, former minister, attorney.

Tsandoulas Konstandinos of Nikolaos, attorney.

Kastoria Nome

Kapakhtsis Georgios of Khristos, attorney.

Simaioforidis Konstandinos, mayor of Kastoria, educator.

Kerkyra Nome

Ngikas Sotirios of Stefanos, Lt. General (ret).

Kaloudis Dimitrios of Spyros, deputy, attorney.

Kogevinas Alekos of Linos, civil engineer.

Fronimos Andonios of Gerasimos, attorney.

Kefallinia Nome

Gasparinatos Spyros of G., attorney.

Gerakis Panagis of Konstandinos, deputy, attorney.

Messaris Kharalambos of E., deputy, attorney.

Kilkis Nome

Avramidis Alexandros of Kh., former deputy minister, professor of ASOEE [Higher School of Economic and Commercial Sciences].

Avgerinidis Nikolaos of Anastasios, economist, businessman.

Papadopoulos Kharalambos of K. deputy, architect.

Pavlidis Theodoros, president of ONNED [Youth Organization of the New Democracy].

Kozani Nome

Athanasiadis Stavros of Athanasios, deputy, theologian.

Vagiatis Ioannis of Athanasios, former deputy, former president of Cotton Organization, agriculturist.

Vyzas Themistoklis of Vasileios, deputy, attorney.

Exarkhos Ioannis, dentist.

Ketoglidis Georgios, attorney.

Papadopoulos Georgios of Vasileios, deputy, economist.

Papakonstandinou Mikhail of Georgios, former deputy minister, attorney.

Korinthia Nome

Dimas Stavros of Konstandinos, former minister, economist.

Papaligouras Anastasios of Panagiotis, member of the Administrative Committee, attorney.

Rendis Theokharis of Konstandinos, former deputy minister, civil engineer.

Spanorrigas Alexandros of Athanasios, former minister, economist.

Lakonia Nome

Giatrakos Konstandinos-Thrasivoulos of Georgios, former deputy, economist.

Davakis Dimitrios of Dikaios, former minister, pharmacist.

Minakakis Stavros of Dimitrios, deputy, physician.

Panaritis Vasileios of Konstandinos, deputy, attorney.

Stathopoulos Ioannis of Panagiotis, deputy, Commander, Hellenic Navy.

Tsingounis Mikhail of Theodoros, farmer, former town mayor.

Gorgoulis Athanasios of Dimitrios, attorney.

Ngaranis Georgios of Ioannis, former deputy.

Grammatidis Christos or Takis of Ioannis, former deputy minister, journalist.

Grousopoulos Evangelos of Konstandinos, attorney.

Evstratiadis Agamemnon of Miltiadis, deputy, civil engineer.

Kitsidis Christos of Athanasios, former deputy, economist.

Kyriakou Eleftherios of Kimon, deputy, attorney.

Mammonas Nikolaos of Dimitrios, attorney.

Souflis Georgios of Athanasios, former deputy minister, civil engineer.

Fasoulas Vasileios of Ilias, former deputy, stock-farmer.

#### Lasithion Nome

Kothris Emmanouil of Mikhail, former minister, attorney.

Kountourakis Emmanouil of Georgios, professor of KATEE [Higher Technical Education Centers of Greece].

Lagoudakis Andonios of Konstndinos, ducator.

Sergakis Ioannis of Mikhail, former deputy, attorney.

#### Lesvos Nome

Vigelis Nikolaos of Grigorios, former deputy, former secretary general of the Ministry of Justice

Giapalis Aristeidis of Konstandinos, professor of political science, attorney, graduate of the Technical Management School of France.

Kalaitzis Andreas of Grigorios, businessman.

Kalogirou Doukas of Xenofon, former deputy, attorney.

Nianias Dimitrios of Georgios, former minister, professor EMP [Greek Metsovion Polytechnic School].

Palaiologou Timoleon of Georgios, physician.

Levkas Nome

Kavvadas Panagiotis of Kharilaos, deputy, pharmacist.

Kalkanis Angelos of Konstandinos, attorney, former secretary general of the Ministry of Finance.

Magnisia Nome

Andoniou Khristos, businessman.

Andonopoulos Ioannis of Georgios, deputy.

Diakopoulos Georgios of Dimitrios, deputy, attorney.

Elafras Stamoulis of Konstandinos, former deputy, attorney.

Mbrisimis Nikolaos of Anastasios, former deputy minister, physician.

Papadopoulos Dimitrios of Konstandinos, former deputy, attorney.

Printzos Konstandinos of Dimitrios, deputy, physician.

Sourlas Georgios of I., physician.

Messinia Nome

Anastasopoulos Nikolaos of Dimitrios, deputy, physician.

Laskaris Ioannis of Panagiotis, electro-mechanical engineer, Aachen Polytechnic, W. Germany.

Kalatzakos Aristeidis of Georgios, minister, attorney.

Mboutos Ioannis of Periklis, former minister, attorney.

Oikonomopoulos Konstandinos of Ioannis, deputy, attorney.

Perrotis Aristomenis of Athanasios, former deputy, attorney.

Samaras Andonios of Konstandinos, deputy, economist.

Psarreas Georgios of Dimitrios, attorney.

Andonopoulos Kosmas of Emmanouil, former Nome governor, attorney-sociologist.

#### Xanthi Nome

Alexiou Thomas of Evangelos , former deputy, businessman.

Zeimbek Tzelal of Khousein, deputy, housing expert.

Rodiou Georgios of Stylianos, former deputy minister, attorney.

Serdar Zade Khiousniou of Khasan, landowner.

#### First Piraeus District

Andrianopoulos Andreas of Ioannis, minister, Political Science School graduate.

Gennimatas Panagiotis of Nikolaos, attorney.

Katsafados Ioannis of Nikolaos, deputy, attorney.

Katsivardakos Vasileios of Andonios, former deputy, physician.

Markozanis Spyridon of Emmanouil, deputy, businessman.

Mbasakidis Nikolaos of Sokratis, councilman, City of Piraeus, pharmacist.

Mbiris Stavros of Ioannis, former minister, member of the Administrative Committee of the ND.

Papapolitis Sotirios of Savvas, former secretary general of the Ministry of Regional Planning and Development.

Savvopoulos Evangelos of Georgios, former minister, sociologist.

Sarlis Pavlos of Theodoros, former secretary general of the Ministry of Merchant Marine, attorney.

#### Second Piraeus District

Vougiouklakis Ilias of Ioannis, former deputy, attorney.

Giatrakos Ioannis of Drakoulis, attorney.

Drimylis Spyridon of Georgios, attorney.

Iosifidis Konstandinos of Anestis, civil engineer.

Kalogiannis Pandelis of Ioannis, former deputy, attorney, former president of The OLP [Piraeus Port Authority].

Mbougas Georgios of Khristos, deputy, attorney.

Nerantzis Anastasios of Dimitrios, former deputy, former secretary general of the Chamber of Deputies, attorney.

Papapolitis Nikolaos of Ioannis, deputy, university professor.

Tragakis Ioannis of Dimitrios, deputy, topographical engineer.

Khrimatopoulos Fotios of D., deputy, former secretary general of the Ministry of Merchant Marine.

#### Pella Nome

Gatsios Theofilos, mayor of Aridaia, physician.

Ngillas Aristarkhos of Khristos, deputy.

Deligiannis Dimosthenis of Nikolaos, deputy, attorney.

Doulgeridis Khristodoulos of Nikolaos, attorney.

Zografos Antigonos of Vasileios, former deputy, dentist.

Manousakis Diakos of Manousos, dentist.

#### Pieria Nome

Ngoungourelas Konstandinos of Kh., attorney.

Dimopoulos Ioannis of Konstandinos, former deputy minister, attorney.

Elevtheriadis Elevtherios of E., mathematician.

Sousourogianis Evangelos of A., deputy, attorney.

Preveza Nome

Konofagos Konstandinos of Ilias, former minister, Polytechnic School professor.

Mbalkos Anastasios of Miltiadis, former minister, deputy, Lt. General (ret).

Papanikolaou Vasileios, of Evangelos, attorney.

Rethymni Nome

Kefalogiannis Ioannis of Konstandinos, former deputy minister, physician.

Fradelos Emmanouil of Ioannis, electro-mechanical engineer.

Rodopi Nome

Adnan Gioudoufoglou of Gioudouf, merchant.

Memet Oglou Giasar of Memet, teacher, president of the Vakoufiki Commission on Muslim Property.

Mbletsas Stylianos of Konstandinos, deputy, attorney.

Papandoniou Andonios of V., deputy, attorney.

Salikas Khristos of Nikolaos, attorney.

Khatziandoniou Zafeiris of Georgios, attorney.

Samos Nome

Kratsas Zakharias of Georgios, deputy, physician.

Sofoulis Themistoklis of Panos, attorney, former secretary general of the Ministry of Civilization and Sciences.

Spyrou Ioannis of Xenofon, deputy, physician.

Serrai Nome

Angelousis Angelos of Khristos, former minister, attorney.

Karamanlis Akhilleas of Georgios, former deputy minister, attorney.

Kleitos Nikolaos of Ioannis, deputy, attorney.

Kositzidis Georgios of Theodoros, deputy, attorney.

Lavrendidis Isaak of Nikolaos, deputy, attorney.

Papadopoulos Theodoros, attorney.

Papanagiotou Konstandinos, attorney.

Tavlaridis Ioannis, agriculturist.

Khristoglou Ioannis of Georgios, deputy, attorney.

Trikala Nome

Georgolios Konstandinos, educator.

Giannousis Kleovoulos of Vasileios, former deputy minister, deputy, attorney.

Dervenagas Athanasios of Andonios, deputy, attorney.

Papakhristos Athanasios of Nikolaos, deputy, attorney.

Sakkas Ioannis of A., pharmacist.

Stamatis Konstandinos, attorney.

Khatzidakis Sotirios of Mikhail, deputy, attorney.

Fthiotis Nome

Evangeliou Dimitrios of K., deputy, attorney.

Kalatzis Konstandinos of Khristos, attorney.

Manikas Georgios of Sotirios, businessman.

Mbrianis Konstandinos of Dimitrios, attorney.

Xarkhas Athanasios of Lazaros, attorney.

Panourgias Panourgias of Stylianos, former deputy minister, retired General.

Trindafillou Konstandinos of Ioannis, former deputy minister, attorney.

Tsirimokou-Pimbli Ioulia, deputy, Political Sciences graduate.

Florina Nome

Andreadis Georgios of Andreas, deputy, attorney.

Theokharidis Dimosthenis of Mikhail, former deputy, former secretary general of the Ministry of Northern Greece.

Mavridis Konstandinos of Kyriakos, deputy, attorney.

Fokis Nome

Ngelestathis Nikolaos of A., attorney.

Khloros Dimitrios of Georgios, deputy, attorney.

Manetas Panagiotis of Theodoros, retired Brigadier.

Khalkidiki Nome

Kyriafinis Ioannis of Georgios, physician, former deputy.

Stamos Dimitrios of Stamos, physician, deputy.

Tsioumblakis Konstandinos of Eleftherios, deputy, professor.

Fyrgadis Khristos of Apostolos, attorney.

Khania Nome

Violakis Petros of Konstandinos, businessman.

Voloudakis Georgios of Iosif, former deputy, economist.

Markogiannakis Khristos of Emmanouil, attorney, former district attorney.

Mitsotakis Konstandinos of Kyriakos, minister, attorney.

Pentaris Vasileios of Stamatis, former deputy, civil engineer of EMP [Greek Metsovion Polytechnic School]

Stamatakis Stylianos of Nikolaos, Major General (ret).

Khios Nome

Kefalas Ioannis of Konstandinos, attorney.

Mavridoglou Isidoros of Nikolaos, former minister, former president of OLP [Piraeus Port Authority].

Misailidis Georgios of Stamatis, former secretary general of ND.

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**COMPLETE LIST OF PASOK CANDIDATES PUBLISHED**

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 12 Sep 81 p 9

[Text] The PASOK candidates by district are as follows:

**FIRST ATHENS District**

(22 seats, 24 candidates, 19 announced)

I. Alevras, member of the Executive Council, parliamentary representative; L. Danos, journalist; G. Daskalakis, insurance agent, syndicalist, Central Committee [KE] member; M. Doris, architect, KE member; G. Koutsokhors, lawyer, novelist; Evang. Kouloumbis, civil engineer, president, Technical Chamber of Commerce [TEE]; T. Katsifaras, former president of the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank [ETVA]; Th. Mylonas, lawyer-international law expert; G. Mortzos, actor, KE member; G. Birdimiris, civil engineer; D. Bouloukos, lawyer; A. Peponis, lawyer, KE member; T. Papageorgopoulos, retired officer; D. Pagoropoulos, lawyer, Regional Council chairman; P. Petroulas, economist; V. Priovolos, engineer; K. Papapanagiotou, lawyer; Mil. Samartzis, physician; Amalia Fleming, physician.

**SECOND ATHENS District**

(28 seats, 30 candidates, 24 announced)

Sylva Akrita, former deputy; St. Alexandris, lawyer, KE member; G. Asimakopoulos, lawyer; P. Anagnostopoulos, retired officer; L. Veryvakis, lawyer; Evang. Giannopoulos, lawyer, KE member; D. Evangelatos, lawyer; T. A. Zarkadas, nomarch; Ap. Kaklamanis, lawyer, KE member; Il. Katrivanos, lawyer; Maria Perraki-Kyriatiki, physician; P. Kondogiorgos, lawyer; Nora Katseli, actress; Eirini Lambraki, lawyer; G. Margelis, physician; K. Diniakos, lawyer; St. Panagoulis, economist, KE member; X. Peloponnisos, section chief, Social Services Ministry; Mil. Papaioannou, lawyer, KE member; St. Tsoumacas, lawyer, KE member; N. Papadionysiou, teacher; St. Tsoumakis, lawyer, KE member; G. Haralambopoulos, mechanican engineer, retired officer, District Office member, parliamentary representative; G. Kharalambous, lawyer.

[Rest of] ATTIKI District

(6 seats, 8 candidates, 7 announced)

M. Vathis, lawyer; E. Giotas, lawyer, KE member; Th. Drosis, lawyer; Il. Papailias, economist; K. Petouris, mechanical engineer; S. Papamikhalis, lawyer; Th. Pangalos, economist.

AKHAIA District

(8 seats, 10 candidates, 10 announced)

Th. Golfinopoulos, chemist, KE member; G. Kakogiannis, lawyer; G. Kapouralos, syndicalist, president, Patrai Labor Center; M. Koutsogiorgas, lawyer, KE member; Al. Maraslis, physician; Maria Massara, dentist, A. G. Papandreou, economist; P. Salamalikis, lawyer; Sr. Solomos, physician; N. Khampsas, physician.

ARTA District

(3 seats, 4 candidates, 4 announced)

Al. Liarokapis, lawyer; Khr. Papageorgiou, teacher; P. Rizos, agriculturist; D. Tsovolas, lawyer.

ARKADIA District

(5 seats, 7 candidates, 7 announced)

D. Arkhos, lawyer; Sp. Giannopoulos, physician; D. Davetas, worker-syndicalist; K. Papaspyridis, retired officer; Dim. Repas, dentist; K. Spiliopoulos, lawyer.

ARGOLIS District

(3 seats, 4 candidates, 4 announced)

Sp. Vasileiou, lawyer; I. Koutsogiannis, retired officer; I. Oikonomopoulos, lawyer; D. Papaioannou, agriculturist.

AITOLOAKARNANIA District

(9 seats, 11 candidates, 10 announced)

A. Dimitrakopoulos, lawyer; Th. Kotsombinas, physician; Kh. Basagiannis, lawyer; Khr. Neilas, dentist; N. Papaioannou, lawyer; G. Papadimitriou, retired senior civil servant; P. Paparounis, lawyer; Kh. Rokofyllios, lawyer; G. Serpanos, retired senior civil servant; I. Khardalias, economist.

**VOIOTIA District**

**(4 seats, 6 candidates, 5 announced)**

A. Akrivakis, lawyer; G. Katsimbardis, lawyer; G. Kalogirou, lawyer; Pan. Kinias, professor; G. Pattas, retired officer.

**IOANNINA District**

**(5 seats, 7 candidates, 7 announced)**

L. Glinavos, oenologist-chemist; Artemis Karasa, housewife; Them. Loulis, lawyer; G. Moraitis, lawyer; K. Papulias, lawyer, KE member; M. Papathomopoulos, university professor; Ioan. Zoukis, farmer.

**GREVENA District**

**(1 seat, 2 candidates, 2 announced)**

I. Konstandinidis, lawyer; N. Skhoinas, employee.

**DRAMA District**

**(3 seats, 4 candidates, 4 announced)**

K. Gounatidis, lawyer; D. Kefalidis, lawyer; Fl. Konstandinidis, economist; I. Bervanidis, teacher.

**DODEKANISSOS District**

**(4 seats, 6 candidates, 6 announced)**

V. Voukouvalidis, university instructor; Kl. Zervos, retired officer; Em. Kokkinos, lawyer; G. Parasakevas, civil engineer; K. Sfyriou, civil engineer; G. Khiotakis, lawyer.

**EVROS District**

**(5 seats, 7 candidates, 6 announced)**

G. Andonakoudis, civil engineer; Ath. Evstathiou, lawyer; Kh. Karypidis, farmer; I. Papadopoulos, physician; Kh. Stamatopoulos, veterinarian; A. Fotiadis, lawyer.

**EVVOIA District**

**(6 seats, 8 candidates, 8 announced)**

D. Venetis, lawyer; G. Grammatikopoulos, physician; V. Kedikoglou, civil engineer; Eleni Leondi, architect; Th. Metaxas, civil engineer; T. Papageorgiou, civil engineer; D. Sapoutzis, physician; M. Stefanidis, lawyer.

**EVRYTANIA District**

(1 seat, 2 candidates, 2 announced)

I. Papadimas, physician; K. Tsigaridis, lawyer.

**ZAKYNTHOS District**

(1 seat, 2 candidates, 2 announced)

Anna Renesi-Arvanitaki, dentist; G. Klavdianos, economist.

**ILEIA District**

(7 seats, 9 candidates, 9 announced)

Nakis Avgerinos, lawyer; D. Georgakopoulos, bank employee; Ir. Matrangas, physician; L. Panopoulos, assistant mechanic; R. Petralias, lawyer; G. Skoularikis, lawyer, KE member; Alk. Sakkas, civil engineer; L. Tsikas, teacher; K. Frangogiannopoulos, lawyer.

**IMATHIA District**

(4 seats, 6 candidates, 6 announced)

M. Ginoglou, mechanical engineer; K. Manganaris, farmer-cooperativist; N. Moungris, lawyer; V. Papagiannis, lawyer; Al. Bourliotopoulos, dentist; Khr. Mantzaris, dentist.

**IRAKLEION District**

(7 seats, 9 candidates, 9 announced)

K. Aslanis, civil engineer; M. Drettakis, higher education professor, KE member; Al. Darivianakis, lawyer; Vang. Kalaitzakis, retired officer; G. Papanikolakis, retired officer; Em. Papastefanakis, lawyer; A. Skoulas, lawyer-journalist; P. Tsakiris, farmer; St. Serafeimidis, physician, KE member.

**FIRST THESSALONIKI District**

(12 seats, 14 candidates, 14 announced)

N. Athanasopoulos, former appeals court assistant prosecutor; N. Akritidis, surveyor-engineer; P. Vlakhos, merchant; M. Vogiatzis, merchant; A. Intzes, lawyer; A. Kalidopoulos, lawyer; A. Kazazis, lawyer; Kh. Kastanidis, lawyer; A. Kourtis, journalist; Th. Manavis, lawyer; Kh. Makridis, dentist; St. Papathemelis, lawyer; D. Khatzipetros, worker-syndicalist; Sofia Kharitidou, artisan.

**SECOND THESSALONIKI District**

(7 seats, 9 candidates, 8 announced)

K. Amanetidis, farmer; K. Diamandis, Khlastra Community president; D. Dimitriou, president, Xyloupolis Community; An. Karras, lawyer; A. Mantzaris, lawyer; St. Tsaparas, lawyer, Ioan. Glavinas, lawyer; St. Mariadis, agriculturist.

**THESPROTIA District**

(2 seats, 3 candidates, 3 announced)

Th. Giannoulis, lawyer; A. Kolioudis, civil engineer; P. Liakos, pharmacist.

**KAVALA District**

(4 seats, 6 candidates, 5 announced)

D. Gretsikos, retired civil servant; D. Dimosthenopoulos, lawyer; Il. Papadopoulos, teacher; Il. Saitanidis, employee-farmer; I. Tsaklidis, civil engineer.

**KARDITSA District**

(6 seats, 8 candidates, 6 announced)

S. Anastasakos, lawyer; P. Katsaros, lawyer; N. Blatsis, teacher; V. Brakatsoulas, lawyer; St. Bazianas, lawyer; D. Dalambiras, lawyer; K. Papakyritsis, architect; Il. Khatzoplakis, lawyer.

**KASTORIA District**

(1 seat, 2 candidates, 2 announced)

F. Petsalnikos, economist; P. Papathanasiou, dentist.

**KERKYRA District**

(3 seats, 4 candidates, 3 announced)

Sp. Kaloudis, lawyer; S. Rallis, lawyer; Piretta Tsoulou, housewife.

**KEFALLINIA District**

(2 seats, 3 candidates, 3 announced)

F. Andrianatos, dentist; T. Mandelis, lawyer; A. Tritsis, city-planner

KILKIS District

(3 seats, 4 candidates, 4 announced)

S. Marinidis, economist; A. Mikhailidis, artisan; D. Xenidis, civil engineer; D. Oikonomou, retired officer.

KOZANI District

(5 seats, 7 candidates, 6 announced)

G. Davidopoulos, teacher; I. Kousis, lawyer; R. Kokelidis, university instructor; M. Kyratsous, lawyer, KE member; M. Natsinas, lawyer; K. Dongalidis, syndicalist.

KORINTHIA District

(4 seats, 6 candidates, 6 announced)

V. Giannakoulias, dentist; Th. Kotsonis, physician; K. Potiris, physician; I. Pottakis, lawyer; N. Rizogiannis, lawyer; G. Spiliotis, lawyer.

KYKLADES District

(4 seats, 6 candidates, 5 announced)

Petros Katsipis Valvis, lawyer; D. Kyriakos, teacher; N. Levogiannis, teacher; N. Paraskevas, sculptor; N. Filaretos, merchant ship master.

LAKONIA District

(4 seats, 6 candidates, 6 announced)

G. Vilias, former appeals court prosecutor; M. Diasakos, teacher; K. Kakhrimanis, lawyer; St. Kalavrytinos, mineralogist; K. Deros, physician; P. Founda, dentist.

LARISA Nome

(8 seats, 10 candidates, 10 announced)

V. Agorastis, lawyer; I. Karapatsas, lawyer; N. Koutsomarkos, dentist; N. Mikhis, lawyer; Z. Bekos, lawyer; Sot. Polyzos, farmer-cooperativist; D. Papavasileiou, professor of Higher Technical Education Centers; Th. Stathis, professor, Higher Education Schools; I. Floros, physician, KE member; A. Khondronasios, president, Nikaiia Community.

LASITHION District

(3 chairs, 4 candidates, 4 announced)

G. Afordakos, university professor; K. Kondopodis, teacher; G. Bimblas, lawyer; E. Khatzinakis, teacher.

### LESVOS District

(4 seats, 6 candidates, 6 announced)

D. Vounatsos, lawyer; Kaiti Sourou, artisan; E. Kiosklis, lawyer; G. Maliakas, lawyer; K. Pelekos, dentist; Kh. Pandelaroudis, teacher.

### LEVKAS District

(1 seat, 2 candidates, 2 announced)

G. Ktenas, physician; V. Palmos, physician.

### MAGNISIA District

(6 seats, 8 candidates, 8 announced)

G. Doxopoulos, lawyer; P. Zakolikos, lawyer; St. Kotsfras, teacher, D. Kostas, teacher; V. Matsangos, mechanic; D. Pitsioris, mechanical engineer; G. Pappas, merchant; Dina Papastefanou, teacher.

### MESSINIA District

(6 seats, 8 candidates, 8 announced)

Ismini Gyftaki, teacher; F. Koutsikas, lawyer; Ap. Bouloukos, retired officer; D. Samios, farmer-cooperativist; V. Tsapogas, lawyer; G. Tsonis, civil engineer; A. Filippopoulos, physician, Khr. Kharalambopoulos, retired officer.

### XANTHIA District

(3 seats, 4 candidates, 3 announced)

Kh. Atmatzidis, artisan; N. Georgiadis, former employee, Greek Tourist Organization; Orkhan Khatzibriam, lawyer.

### FIRST PIRAEUS District

(8 seats, 10 candidates, 10 announced)

G. Axarlis, merchant marine officer-syndicalist; K. Kanavakis, lawyer; G. Kasimatis, lawyer; Kalliopi Bourdara, sociologist; Em. Beteniotis, lawyer; A. Dendidakis, lawyer; I. Papaspyrou, economist, KE member; K. Stratinalakis, economist; K. Christopoulos, customs inspector; D. Khondrokoukis, retired officer.

### SECOND PIRAEUS District

(8 seats, 10 candidates, 10 announced)

V. Astrakos, syndicalist; D. Diamandidis, merchant; P. Kritikos, lawyer; G. Massavetas, journalist, M. Merkouri, actress, KE member; G. Niotis, lawyer; E.

Pendaris, merchant marine captain; G. Paidakakis, syndicalist, KE member, Khr. Fotiou, lawyer; G. Khaskas, lawyer.

PELLA District

(5 seats, 7 candidates, 7 announced)

D. Giatanidis, farmer, KE member; S. Kekhagiglou, physician; G. Paskhalidis, civil engineer; G. Petsos, economist; D. Papadimitriou, sociologist; K. Siganidis, lawyer; A. Tsandis, lawyer.

PREVEZA District

(2 seats, 3 candidates, 3 announced)

Sp. Katiniotis, lawyer; Khr. Maleskhos, civil engineer; Kal. Papakhristos, physician.

RETHYMNI District

(3 seats, 4 candidates, 4 announced)

Kharil. Georgakakis, employee; M. Loukakis, civil engineer; G. Perakis, lawyer; S. Sbokos, civil engineer.

SAMOS District

(2 seats, 3 candidates, 3 announced)

G. Kallergis, physician; St. Margaronis, dentist; N. Khoulis, civil engineer.

SERRAI District

(8 seats, 10 candidates, 10 announced)

E. Anthopoulos, lawyer; V. Vasilakakis, veterinarian; G. Georgoulas, lawyer; A. Diamianidis, lawyer; G. Theodoridis, lawyer; V. Intzes, electrical engineer, KE member; A. Kalogerakis, farmer-cooperativist; A. Papadopoulos, lawyer; V. Pazarlis, lawyer; P. Skemberis, pharmacist.

TRIKALA District

(5 seats, 7 candidates, 7 announced)

K. Alexiadis, lawyer; G. Vardoulis, physician; I. Kambagiannis, lawyer; D. Mantzaris, lawyer; Th. Mernditis, dentist; Kh. Oikonomou, physician; A. Balantzas, retired officer.

FTHIOTIS District

(6 seats, 8 candidates, 7 announced)

Khr. Karageorgiou, journalist; G. Kyriopoulos, artisan; Th. Batsos, lawyer; N. Papaspyris, agriculturist; Evang. Staikos, lawyer; G. Sakellariou, lawyer; K. Tsirimokos, lawyer.

FOKIS District

(2 seats, 3 candidates, 3 announced)

F. Arvanitis, entrepreneur; Bakogiannis, lawyer; Ar. Sissouras, university professor.

KHALKIDIKI District

(3 seats, 4 candidates, 4 announced)

V. Evangelinos, lawyer; G. Bogdanos, mineralogist; Z. Xanthopoulos, civil engineer; G. Stogiorgis, lawyer.

KHANIA District

(4 seats, 6 candidates, 6 announced)

G. Varkaris, physician, KE member; A. Gazis, lawyer; I. Mikhelogiannis, lawyer; N. Malindretos, lawyer; G. Prasianakis, lawyer; M. Skoulakis, physician.

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CSO: 4621/111

POLITICAL

GREECE

KKE-INTERIOR CANDIDATES LISTED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 17 Sep 81 p 7

Text7 KKE-Interior announced the following candidates in the First Thessaloniki District:

- 1) Manolis Anagnostakis, poet; 2) Thomas Vasileiadis, member, Salonica Municipal Council, civil engineer; 3) Theano Veneti, secretary of the Associated Political Refugees of Northern Greece; 4) Panos Dimitriou, member of the KKE-Int. Central Committee Executive Council; 5) Thodoros Kazelis, employee, KKE-Int. Central Committee member; 6) Kostas Koutsomytelis, member of the Central Council of the Greek Communist Youth EKON "Rigas Ferraios," Salonica branch secretary, medical student; 7) Thanasis Papadopoulos, journalist, KKE-Int. Central Committee member; 8) Kostas Papathodorou, member, Salonica Municipal Council, architect; 9) Alekos Papalexiou, former EDA deputy from Salonica, KKE-Int. Central Committee member; 10) Alekos Petridis, member, EKON "Rigas Ferraios" Central Council, law student; 11) Morfis Stafoudis, metal worker, syndicalist; 12) Giorgos Triandafyllidis, lawyer, former Salonica Municipal Council president; 13) Kaiti Tseroukha, agriculturalist; and 14) Levteris Khalvatzis, secretary of the Salonica Party Organization, private employee.

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CSO: 4621/7

## KKE ANNOUNCES COMPLETE LIST OF CANDIDATES

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 20 Sep 81 pp 3, 4

[Text] The electoral KKE tickets represent battle slates for a true change. Their composition represents truly and authentically the popular mandate for a complete delivery of the country from the Right for chartering a new direction in the country's progress.

The tickets represent five generations of fighters of our national resistance; of the 11<sup>th</sup> /1950's law restricting communist activities/; of the anti-dictatorial Polytechnic School struggle; and of today's struggles by workers and the people. All of them embrace specific principles and political directions, fighters all for a change without "ballot riggings," without presumably necessary reconciliations, "maneuverings" and retreats. Persons well-known to the working people, to the fighters for democracy and to the leftists compose an aggressive, united ballot. They have participated in all the people's struggles for many years.

It is the only ticket which deservedly represents the fighting Greek Left. In addition to the KKE cadres--who are fighting responsibly for the unification of the historic leftist front--the ticket includes leaders in the broader progressive area. Among them are Mikis Theodorakis, Kostas Nasis, Makis Trikoukis, Bost and others. Many others who are not on the ticket for various reasons are supporting the KKE candidates, are heading election committees and are working hard for the success of the party's election goals.

The KKE slates represent the working class and all working people. They include workers experienced in all class struggles, able syndicalists, cooperativists, and farmers. In contrast to the tickets of other parties which include mostly businessmen, representatives of the middle class, industrialists and shipowners, the KKE ballot abounds in workers, employees and farmers as well as professionals, tradesmen, craftsmen, etc. KKE, the party of the working class, gives precedence to its representatives (about one third of the total).

It is a ticket of our proud youth, because KKE believes that the new generation can and must participate massively in the popular struggles, providing all their freshness and dynamism. KKE is the party which embodies the youth's dreams for a new world. It is the party of youth. Many representatives of the struggling youth appear on the party's ballot: Maria Damaskaki, Giorgos Stamatakis, former president of the National Student Union of Greece [ESEE], Triandafyllos

Dravaliaris, presently a member of the EFEE Administrative Council, Panagiotis Sofos, president of the VIAMAX union, Thanasis Ballomenos, president of the textile workers, Takis Kharitos, secretary of the University of Salonica Student Union, Dimitris Arkhondis, architect and member of the Karditsa Municipal Council and many others.

The KKE ticket includes outstanding men of arts and letters--many professionals and artists who found a source of inspiration in the people and their struggles. It includes many women--a proof of the party's fight for equality and for the emancipation of half the country's population.

#### The Euro-deputies

Similar is the party's ticket composition as concerns the candidates for the European Council. It includes experienced syndicalist cadres and professionals. It is indeed an aggressive ticket which guarantees that our representatives in the European area will fight steadily against the consequences resulting from the induction into the EEC.

Among them is Vasilis Eframidis, a devoted fighter known for his aggression in the dictatorship Chamber of Deputies and Takis Adamos, journalist, editor-in-chief of RIZOSPASTIS. Also there are representatives of the younger generation of fighters such as Alekos Alavanos, Giorgos Delastik, Makis Trikoukis, lawyer and expert on European problems, former member of the EDA executive council and a worker of the Left who works diligently for unity and others.

The representatives of the working people represent one fourth of the ticket for the European Council. Among them are: M. Pytharoulis, president of the United Anti-dictatorial Labor Movement-Cooperating, Dimos Koutoliotakis, president of the LARKO union, Nikos Tzanidakis, secretary general of the Federation of Construction Workers, and Professor Giorgos Panitsidis, specialist in agrarian problems.

The KKE ticket represents a continuation of the people's struggles. Along with the national resistance fighters are many former deputies, cadres of the pre-dictatorship EDA and representatives of the Polytechnic School generation. It represents the struggle of whole decades--unyielding, unwavering, unambivalent and involving many heavy sacrifices--for national independence, democratic normalcy, popular freedoms.

KKE has given the call for ousting the Right, for achieving a great parliamentary majority of all forces of change--a majority which will be able to form a strong democratic government. As of today, the battle for ballots begins--the daily, persistent, systematic work from house to house in order for the party's slates to reach everywhere. The times do not allow for the least delay or postponement. Only the participation of KKE in the second distribution of votes can guarantee the defeat of the Right, can bring about a strong majority in favor of change and a democratic government which will guarantee the end of the diversionary actions and undermining actions of the reactionaries. This can be achieved because KKE represents "stability in the positions for change, the aggressive coherence

and organization, the responsible policy for unity, the efficiency for mobilizing the people, the heroic traditions" (from the electoral announcement by the KKE Central Committee). The list of KKE candidates by districts is as follows:<sup>7</sup>

#### FIRST ATHENS DISTRICT

Leonidas V. Avdis, lawyer, vice president of the Athens Bar association; Paraskevas K. Velissaris, accountant, former member Athens Municipal Council; Evstratios E. Voulamakis, craftsman, president, Panhellenic Federation of Dry Cleaners and Dyers, vice president of DIKEVE [expansion unknown]; Triandafyllos P. Dravaiaris, student, member EFEE Central Council; Giannis S. Epitropou, private employee, syndicalist; Eleni P. Xenou, teacher; Anastasios A. Kapralos, Olympic Airlines employee, secretary general of the Olympic technicians' union; Soula A. Karanika, accountant, counter-revolutionary; Maria N. Kefalinou, worker, president, Ready-Made Dress Workers' Union; Thomas A. Kougiangas, physician; Kostas Th. Marangoudakis, accountant, president, Panhellenic Federation of Accountants; Mendis (Bost) Bostanzoglou, journalist, cartoonist; Georgios E. Papavasileiou, worker; Ilias G. Papamikail, pharmacist, vice president, Panhellenic Association of Pharmacists; Giorgos Kh. Sarris, construction worker, alternate secretary general of the Construction Workers' Federation; Giorgos L. Stamatakis, lawyer; Foivos S. Tsekeris, member of the Technical Chamber of Greece [TEE], Disciplinary Council; Aimilia K. Ypsilandi, actress, president, Greek Actors' Association; Grigoris K. Farakos, electrical engineer, deputy; Stavros Khatzistefanidis G. Stavros, tradesman, president, Attiki Artisans, Tradesmen and Shopkeepers' Union.

#### SECOND ATHENS DISTRICT

Kharilaos Florakis; Giorgos N. Andonakakis, stage producer; Lambros I. Artavanis, worker, president, shoemakers' union; Despoina T. Venetsanopoulou, retired worker, vice president, Federation of Social Insurance Foundation-Social Insurance Organizations' Pensioners; Maria Th. Damanaki, chemical engineer, deputy; Litsa Kh. Doudoumi, mechanic; Giannis G. Theonas, senior employee of the Greek Tourist Organization [OTE], syndicalist; Kostas V. Kappos, economist, deputy; Manolis K. Karystianos, taxi driver, member of the "ALIMOS-ENOTITA" administrative council; Themistoklis P. Karras, physician; Nikos A. Kyriazopoulos, private employee, Aigaleo Municipal Council member; Lazaros S. Kyritsis, lawyer, Zografos Municipal Council member; Dimitris M. Lazaridis, historian, Kaisariani Municipal Council member; Diamandis Z. Mavrodoglou, construction worker, president, Federation of Construction Workers, deputy; Pavlos I. Mikhailidis, civil engineer; Thanasis S. Balomenos, worker, president, Textile Workers' Union; Kostas Kh. Nasis, cadre of the Agrarian and Cooperative Movement, president Pan-Ipeiroton Federation; Evangelia F. Daikou, lawyer; Manolis M. Panagiotakis, mechanic, Public Power Corporation [DEI] employee member of the DEI-GENOP [expansion unknown] Union administrative council; Mariana G. Papoutsopoulou, professor, syndicalist; Agamemnon C. Rakopoulos, entrepreneur-industrialist; Kostas G. Sakkos, dentist, former Ymittos mayor, member Ymittos Municipal Council; Panagiotis D. Sofos, worker, president of car chassis makers' union; Giannis I. Stavropoulos, president, "PROMITHEAS" worker-employees' union; Floros N. Farkonas, marble cutter; Thanasis I. Filias, electrical engineer, OTE deputy director, member of the OTE Engineers' Association and member TEE delegation; Giorgos Th. Psaliopoulos, private employee, member Kallithea Municipal Council, secretary general, Greek-Soviet Association.

## FIRST PIRAEUS DISTRICT

Andonios G. Ambatielos, maritime worker; Aristotelis N. Arapis, physician, radiologist; Nikolaos M. Bistis, president, Piraeus Cinema Club; Ioannis I. Daoundakis, president, Piraeus electro-solderers' union; Konstandinos I. Patidis, civil engineer, member, Piraeus Municipal Council; Dimitrios N. Salpeas, physician, syndicalist; Margarita G. Sapoutzaki, philologist; Dimitrios A. Souliotis, merchant marine wireless operator, president of Maritime Workers' Syndicalist Movement, Piraeus Municipal Council member.

## SECOND PIRAEUS DISTRICT

Ioannis E. Vafidis, philologist; Timotheos Th. Gerakis, worker, syndicalist, Perama Municipal Council member; Mikis Theodorakis (composer); Nikosaos A. Themelis, civil engineer, assistant to Korydallos mayor, member of the Korydallos Municipal Council; Thodoros N. Nikolaidis, chemist, member of the Piraeus Union of the Greek Advertising Enterprises, member, Parent-Guardians' Association; Nikandros M. Kepesis, private employee, deputy; Dimitra K. Kalogiros, dentist, Salamis nomarchy counselor, president Salamis Women's Association; Evangelos P. Xenos, member, KHROPEI Workers' Union administrative Council, member, United Anti-dictatorial Labor Movement (ESAK-S) administrative council; Eleni Th. Papadopoulou, employee, Keratsini Municipal Council member; Drigorios L. Touglidis, merchant marine engineer, assistant secretary, Panhellenic Merchant Marine Engineers (PEMEN).

## REMAINDER OF ATTIKI NOME

Nikos Angelopoulos, steel worker, vice president, Elefsis Labor Center; Grigoris Aliferis, engineer, president, Menidi Municipal Council; Thodoros Kaklamanakis, economist, member Glyka Nera Community Council; Thanasis Levendis, neurosurgeon; Vasileios Boufidis, agriculturalist-poultry raiser; Stergios Panagos, president, Ano Lisia Municipal Council, mechanic-printer; Kostas Papapolykhroniou, president, Aspropyrgos Municipal Council; Ioanna Stergiou, working student, social worker at N. Palatia of Oropos.

## FIRST THESSALONIKI DISTRICT

Athanasiros D. Giannousis, lawyer, president Salonica Municipal Council; Ioannis I. Katsaros, worker, vice president, Northern Greece Wearing Apparel Workers' Union; Evstratios G. Kounias, university professor, vice president EDYETH (expansion unknown); Konstandinos S. Levendis, accountant, vice president, Panhellenic League of Professional Soccer Players; Konstandinos I. Moskof, historian, author, president of the Salonica branch of KME (expansion unknown); Anastasios N. Nikolopoulos, president, Salonica Union of Shopkeepers-Cabinet-Makers; Khristos A. Parathyras, physician, president, Northern Greece-Thessalia Lung Disease Specialists' Association; Khristos I. Raftis, syndicalist, mayor of Ambelokipoi; Dimitrios D. Sakhinis, worker, syndicalist, deputy; Panagiota Khr. Sevastiadou, physician, syndicalist; Niki Masoura-Triandafyllidi, actress, winner Kotopouli prize, Salonica festival, Ithaki festival; Georgios N. Tsitselas, construction worker, secretary general of the "Karavan-Serrai" union of construction workers; Sofia V. Frangi, president, Private Hospital Nursing Personnel Union; Dimitrios

A. Kharitos, student, University of Salonica Student Union /FEATH/ secretary general, member EFEE Central Council.

#### SECOND THESSALONIKI DISTRICT

Kyriakos S. Angelopoulos, private employee, president of the ELLENIT worker-employees' union; Eleni G. Iordanaki, accountant; Mikhail E. Karavelas, agriculturalist, president Thessaloniki Nome Farmers' Association; Sotiris G. Kostopoulos, professor; Nikolaos A. Karpoudis, professor; Stelios Khr. Patsalas, fruit and vegetable merchant; Dimitrios N. Pallas, farmer, syndicalist; Theodoros N. Primerakis, civil engineer; Vasileios I. Skandylas, private employee, president, Society of Vasilikion of Salonica.

#### SERRAI

Khrysi A. Gongoglou, accountant; Dimitrios S. Theodoridis, agriculturalist, president, Serrai Farmers' Union, member, Confederation of Greek Farmer Unions; Iraklis L. Thomaidis, assistant electrician; Vasileios L. Ioannidis, farmer, member of the Serrai Farmers' Union Administrative Council; Ioannis L. Katsonis, worker, secretary Serrai ESAK-S; Athanasios Th. Papathanasiou, former deputy; Kharalambos Th. Sarandidis, textile worker, member, Textile Workers' Union administrative council, member of the Serrai Chapter of the Panhellenic Union of National Resistance Fighters /PEAEA/; Konstandinos G. Seirinidis, retired major; Georgios D. Sideris, dentist, secretary, Serrai Dentists' Association, member Serrai Municipal Council; Miltiadis P. Tamos, livestock breeder.

#### EVROS

Vasileios N. Koinakis, artisan; Orestis O. Kolozof, physicist; Kharalambos I. Kyriakidis, farmer, vice president of GPS /expansion unknown/, member, Evros Farmers' Union; Georgios S. Pondikakis, farmer, vice president Union of Didymoteikhon Agricultural Cooperatives /ECS/, member, administrative council of the Evros Nome Farmers-Livestock Breeders' Association; Ioannis P. Tsakiris, accountant; Nikolaos I. Tsinglas, pathologist; Dimitris A. Khondropoulos, farmer.

#### RODOPI

Athanasios K. Theodosiadis, private employee; Konstandinos A. Kambas, construction worker, member of the Construction Workers' Union administrative council, member, municipal council; Dimitrios Th. Keramevs, tailor; member administrative council TEVE pensioners' association; Nikolaos K. Kyriakidis, physician; Moustafa M. Moustafa, physician; Vasileios I. Fetzatzidis, lawyer.

#### KAVALA

Nikolaos A. Kairetis, craftsman, member, municipal council; Athanasios N. Koskiniotis, merchant, Kavala municipal council member; Grigoris I. Bakharis, accountant, municipal council member, president Accountants' Association; Theodoros Khr. Nestoridis, farmer, president Kavala Farmers' Union; Panagiotis V. Rodas, private employee, Kavala Farmers' Union representative and GESASE /expansion unknown/; Theodoros L. Khristidis, worker, member NESTOS Ceramic Workers' Union.

## PELLA

Elevtherios S. Zenginis, farmer, president, Giannitsa Farmers' Union; Nikos I. Kompsopoulos, architect, city planner; Evtimios D. Malezas, lawyer, member Pella chapter of PEAEA; Ioannis N. Bonos, civil engineer, member Cultural Society Administrative Council; Nikolaos G. Papadimitriou, farmer, municipal council member; Iordanis A. Prousandidis, lawyer; Anna I. Teneketzi, designer, syndicalist.

## IMATHIA

Konstandinos S. Georgiadis, agriculturalist; Loukas G. Kavalaris, worker, Naoussa Municipal Council member; Eleni Th. Kokovidou, worker; Stavros G. Sirkos, construction worker, syndicalist; Georgios V. Taxiarkhopoulos, construction worker, president Construction Workers' Union, member of the Federation of Construction Workers' Unions Administrative Council; Ioannis Th. Khristodoulidis, accountant, member, Imathia Farmers' Union Administrative Council.

## KOZANI

Anastasia Pafili-Gouma, student; Theodosis K. Kadoglou, mechan., president Ptolemais Workers-Technicians' Union; Dionysios A. Karagiannis, accountant; Dimitrios Koulioufas, lawyer, secretary general of the Velvetinon Society in Salonica; Georgios Miltiangas, lawyer; Miltiadis S. Sarbanis, farmer, member Farmers' Union administrative council; Miltiadis N. Stefanidis, farmer, vice president, Farmers' Union in Voion Province.

## XANTHI

Polykarpos S. Amaxopoulos, construction worker, secretary Xanthi chapter of ESAK-S; Nikolaos A. Zakhos, civil engineer; Ioannis S. Tsokalidis, worker; Nazif R. Ferkhat, dentist.

## DRAMA

Ioannis I. Gindis, private employee; Diogenis A. Liambrianidis, private employee; Dimitrios G. Papadopoulos, civil engineer; Ioannis A. Patkas, student.

## KILKIS

Epameinondas A. Apostolidis, farmer; Fotios D. Georgiadis, mechanical engineer, foreman; Khristoforos A. Tzatzos, accountant, secretary, Salonica Worker-Employees' Union; Ioannis A. Kharatsiadis, lawyer.

## KHALKIDIKI

Khristodoulos G. Vasilakis, construction worker, secretary, Khalkidiki Labor Center; Dimosthenis V. Matsioris, lawyer; Nikolaos M. Samaras, accountant; Dimitrios E. Stavrinos, dentist.

## PIERIA

Khristos Th. Ananiadis, farmer, municipal council member; Andonios D. Goularas, lawyer, member KME [expansion unknown]; Anthi N. Mouroudi, housewife, member, Pieria Women's Association administrative council; Kharilaos L. Bousios, agrarian cadre, former deputy.

## FLORINA

Smaro M. Menctaki, accountant; Ioannis D. Papaioannou, worker; Kosmas A. Foundoukidis, professor.

## GREVENA

Savvas P. Gavriilidis, civil engineer, Veroia Municipal Council member, representative of Central Union of Municipalities and Communities of Greece [KEDKE]; Khristos I. Stamboulidis.

## KASTORIA

Konstandinos G. Papafilippou, dentist; Konstandinos P. Serafeim, lawyer.

## IOANNINA

Georgios Zoidis, professor; Eleftherios Zolas, lawyer; Khristos Kalaitzis, farm activist; Ermioni Karakhalioi Bletsas, civil engineer; Kostas Papoulias, tradesman, president of Ioannina Tradesmen's and Craftsmen's Federation; Vasileios Sioutis, construction worker; Apostolos Tasioulas, physician.

## THESPROTIA

Konstandinos Vasilokostas, dentist; Aristeidis Maretas, construction worker; Georgios Bounias, house painter.

## ARTA

Spiridon Zarkalis, tradesman; Nikolaos Papakostas, physician; Lambros Sko... s, farm activist; Eleni Tsoumaka, architect.

## PREVEZA

Evripidis Afendoulis, civil engineer; Markos Kaskanis, farm activist; Ioannis Samandas, civil engineer.

## LEVKAS

Gerasimos Aravanis, pharmacist; Georgios Vretos, worker.

## KERKYRA

Panagiotis Anemogiannis, hotel employee, union secretary; Spyridon Boikos, farm activist; Sokratis Papadatos, worker; Spyridon Tryfonas, president Kerkyra Grocers' Union.

## LARISA

Konstandinos G. Gerogiannis, lawyer; Nikos I. Genas, worker; Khristoforos N. Damanis, property owner, assistant to Larisa Mayor; Konstandinos Koudas, professor; Konstandinos D. Loules, lawyer, deputy; Nikolaos I. Milionis, lawyer, secretary Larisa Peace Committee; Andonios I. Skylakes, lawyer; Vasileios L. Tousias, agriculturalist, president Larissa Agrarian Unions, farm activist; Ioannis M. Khotos, worker, president Larissa Labor Center.

## MAGNISIA

Andonios D. Vaitsis, construction worker, president Construction Workers' Union; Aikaterini N. Doumbioti, professor; Nikos S. Kaloudis, seaman, deputy; Konstandinos E. Katsalis; Mikhail I. Papadamos, counter-revolutionary; Panagiotis T. Skotiniotis, lawyer; Ioannis Th. Tsaloukhas, construction worker, syndicalist; Konstandinos N. Khatziargyris, journalist, author.

## TRIKALA

Stefanos K. Zygourakis, pharmacist; Minas K. Makris, worker, syndicalist; Nikolaos G. Makris, civil engineer; Georgios A. Bousias, civil engineer; Dimitrios F. Papanikolaou, lawyer, former deputy; Dimitrios Th. Polyzos, farm activist, secretary Trikala Farmers' Union; Ioannis V. Ritsos, president Trikala Farmers' Union.

## KARDITSA

Dimitrios N. Arkhondis, architect, member Karditsa Municipal Council; George K. Vasardanis, civil engineer; Alexandros P. Kanderes, physician, Dimitrios Evgogias, dentist; Apostolos K. Papandreou, construction worker; Ioannis K. Rakhmanis, farm activist; Khristos K. Filippou, former deputy, mathematics professor.

## FTHIOTIS

Vasileios Kolovos, actor; Maria Kogronia, housewife; Georgios Moraitis, journalist-author; Khristos Oikonomou, industrial worker; Georgios Polykandriotis, assistant engineer, public works contractor; Khristos Rakhiotis, lawyer; Athanasios Tsaros, craftsman; Dimitrios Fitsios, lawyer.

## VOIOTIA

Ioannis Kandiliotis, industrial worker, president Thivai Labor Center; Georgios Kastritis, industrial worker; Loukas Liakos, lawyer; Andreas Loizos, lawyer; Dimitrios Selianitis, lawyer; Georgios Stroumboulos, worker.

## FOKIS

Panagos Koutoulas, journalist; Ioannis Panagis, industrial worker; Ioannis Trian-dafyllou, physician.

## EVRYTANIA

Stavros Mandis, worker; Georgios Tsamis, accountant.

## EVVOIA

Khristos Angelou, construction worker, union president; Apostolos Varsamis, worker; Dimitrios Zygouris, civil engineer; Georgios Liaskos, industrial worker, farmer; Elisavet Papadopoulou, farmer; Dimitrios Stolidis, worker, farmer; Ioannis Tsongas, tradesman.

## AKHAIJA

Vasileios P. Asproulias, Patrai Municipal Council member; Khristos D. Grekiotis, dentist; Dimitrios N. Desyllas, agriculturalist, GESASE general secretary; Panagiotis A. Kosionis, physician, member Patrai Medical Association; Spyridon P. Koutsouvelis, employee, president, Wine Industry Worker-Employees' Union; Athanasios D. Loulemis, member Metal Workers' Union; Ilias V. Papastergiopoulos, lawyer, author, member PEAKVA [expansion unknown] Executive Council; Nikolaos K. Skartsiaris, worker, member executive secretariat of Construction Workers' Federation, member administrative council of Patrai Labor Center; Panagiotis Kh. Stathatos, Patrai Municipal Council member; Georgia L. Khanoumidou, housewife, Patrai Municipal Council member.

## AITOLOAKARNANIA

Ioannis S. Kotopoulos, farmer, second secretary general of the Aitolokarnania Federation of Farmers' Unions; Khristos A. Koufakis, tradesman; Gerasimos P. Kylafis, engineer; Ioannis A. Massoutis, lawyer, member of Mesolongion Municipal Council; Takis Th. Bakothymios, worker, syndicalist, president of Aitolokarnania Operators' Union; Zoi Doutsiou-Daouli, professor of English; Giorgos E. Papapetros, economist; Khristos K. Prionas, lawyer; Nikolaos Th. Sinis, counter-revolutionary; Georgios D. Stavrakis, worker-syndicalist.

## ILEIA

Kharalambos A. Alexandropoulos, painter, counter-revolutionary; Ioannis G. Theodoropoulos, agriculturalist; Ioannis S. Korovasis, dentist, Spyridon K. Lambrinos, physician, member Amalias Municipal Council; Dimitrios G. Papalexopoulos, lawyer-counter-revolutionary; Konstandinos D. Tziatzis, lawyer; Georgios P. Tsitsos, worker, member Construction Workers' Federation administrative council and Pyrgos Labor Center council; Fotios Kh. Flevotamos, tradesman Amalias Municipal Council member.

## KEFALLINIA-ITHAKI

Kharis G. Gaitanidis, civil engineer; Tilemakhos A. Karavias, journalist; Gerasimos D. Stefanatos, journalist.

## ZAKYNTHOS

Ioannis Kh. Gousetis, lawyer; Dionysios G. Sigouros, president, Zakynthos Farmers' Union.

## LAKONIA

Ilias Georgakos, engineer; Paskhalis Doumanis, engineer; Fondas Ladis, journalist; Andonios Batsakis, chemist; Panagiotis Petropoulakis, farmer; Panagos Frangis, dentist.

## MESSINIA

Dimitrios Varelas, accountant; Vasilis Venetsanopoulos, counter-revolutionary; Ilias Georgopoulos, physician; Nikos Makropoulos, professional; Fotios Pandazopoulos, farmer, president Farmers' Union; Petros Tsapralis, worker; Georgios Tsokas, lawyer; Sofia Filndisi, novelist.

## ARKADIA

Georgios Alexogiannis, surveyor; Georgios Vasilopoulos, worker, member, N. Ionia of Athens Municipal Council; Panagiotis Vamos, mathematician; Telis Gondikas, worker; Ioannis Kotsiras, Areios Pagos lawyer; Dimosthenis Marangos, accountant; Ioannis D. Roussos, mathematician.

## ARGOLIS

Konstandinos Vrettos, physician; Evangelos Gladcukhos, tradesman, Georgios Parianos, lawyer; Leonidas Rozikas, farmer.

## KORINTHIA

Alekos Papageorgiou, retired officer (president of repatriated political refugees); Nikolaos Pierros, worker; Dimitrios Rigas, industrial worker, member Loutraki Labor Center; Thanasis Spanos, student.

## LESVOS

Konstandinos Vasalos, employee, deputy; Evstratios Korakas, economist; Andonios Lianos, construction worker, syndicalist; Evstratios Palis, pharmacist; Dimokritos Sakellaridis, physician; Maris Bourou Frangiadaki, housewife.

## SAMOS

Garyfalia Ritsou Georgiadou, physician; Andonios Malafaris, lawyer; Evstratios Tsambis, seaman.

## KHIOS

Georgios Georgitsis, wireless operator; Dimitrios Paneris, construction worker; Nikolaos Pyknis, worker.

### KYKLADES (Islands)

Dimitrios Aaron, geologist; Evangelos Kyritsis, composer; Mikhail Liaroutsos, public employee, member of Kaisariani Municipal Council; Evtimios Mavris, merchant; Dimitrios Milas, worker; Georgios Khatzikonstandis, worker.

### DODEKANISOS

Ilias Kamateros, architect; Emmanuil Lergos, private employee; Panagiotis Mikhailidis, businessman; Mikhail Boulaendis, merchant; Paraskevas Foundourakis, 40-41 war veteran.

### IRAKLEION

Georgios Matthaiakis, lawyer; Georgios Messaritakis, worker, Construction Workers' Union president; Ioannis Moudatos, tradesman; Stelios Orfanos, civil engineer; Mikhail Spyridakis, physician; Daniil Syndazakis, agriculturalist; Theofilos Troulinos, civil engineer; Maria Khoustoulaki, hotel employee.

### KHANIA

Elevtharios Iliakis, journalist; Ioannis Kondoudakis, professor; Andonios Palomenakis, lawyer; Ioannis Bombolakis, tradesman; Kostoula Moundaki Papadaki, public employee; Konstantinos Khiotakis, physician.

### RETHYMNI

Maria Langouvardou, lawyer; Alexandros Mathioudakis, tradesman; Ioannis Stathakis, economist; Nikolaos Stavrakis, farmer.

### LASITHION

Ioannis Dragarakis, economist; Dimitrios Kounenakis, economist-accountant; Ioannis Sifakis, lawyer; Christoforos Khaniotakis, teacher-farm activist.

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CSO: 4621/6

## PROGRESSIVE PARTY CANDIDATES LISTED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 17 Sep 81 p 7

Text The Progressive Party announced yesterday the first list of 103 candidates in 31 districts:

FIRST ATHENS DISTRICT

Spyridon Markezinis; Georgos Alexiadis, lawyer, former minister, former National Radio Institute director; Ilektra Skrivanou-Vasileiadou, novelist-author; Andonios Vogiatzis, lawyer; Alexandros Voultsos, former deputy, former minister; Ilias Glykofrydis, former vice president of the State Council, Police School professor; Georgios Dimitriadis, industrialist-publisher; Konstandinos Thanos, assistant professor, economist, former minister, former Bank of Greece assistant governor; Platon Kazakos, retired navy officer; Andonios Margaronis, electrical engineer; Aristeidis Myrogiannis, craftsman, president of the Athens-Piraeus Furriers, member, Athens Chamber of Craftsmen; Petros Nikolopoulos, retired general, honorary chief, General Army Staff, director of the Greek Democratic National League operations; Apostolos Papageorgiou, lawyer, former minister, former Ministry of Justice secretary general; Eva Sifnaiou, Greek Red Cross volunteer during the guerrilla war; Akhilleus Tagaris, retired lieutenant general, former Patrai University president; Dimitrios Trandas, retired colonel; Kyriakos Sardonis, merchant marine engineer.

## SECOND ATHENS

Thanos Kapsalis, economist, former minister; Nikolaos Argiannis, lawyer; Panagiotis Arfanis, retired navy officer; Fotios Gouras, civil engineer; Marios Gryparis, electrical engineer; Georgios Davakis, retired air force officer, lawyer; Spyridon Zournatzis, lawyer, former deputy minister; Alexis Kaklamanos, painter; Spyridon Katsotas, retired senior officer, former deputy minister, former deputy; Vasileios Liakopoulos, lawyer; Nikolaos Mallios, lawyer, former Ministry of Labor secretary general; Angelos Dendos, retired cities police deputy chief; Dimitrios Pazarlis, syndicalist, Greek Craftsmen's and Tradesmen's Fund; Georgios Passla, lawyer; Konstandinos Panagiotopoulos, merchant marine captain; Omiros Papadopoulos, retired colonel, aide-de-camp to Grivas-Digenis, president Panhellenic League of Fortress Fighters; Nikolaos Papanikolaou, novelist; Ippokratis Savvouras, veterinarian, former deputy; Vasileios Tambakis, retired air force officer, secretary general of the Greek General Confederation of Labor; Vasiliki Khavdoula, journalist.

### ARGOLIS

Dimitrios Ioannou, lawyer; Dimitrios Bastounis, accountant; Dimitrios Skouteris, lawyer.

### ARKADIA

Aristeidis Dimopoulos, lawyer; Triandafyllos Panagopoulos, retired brigadier general; Theodoros Papanidolaou, former school inspector.

### REST OF ATTIKI [None]

Konstandinos Liotis, chemist, former teacher, "Ikaros" schools; Petros Rokkas, lawyer; Dimitrios Sofos, lawyer.

### AKHAIA

Takis Georgakopoulos, insurance agent; Andreas Mandrekas, industrialist; Christos Mikhalos, former minister; Panagiotis Nikolaidis, retired colonel; Nikolaos Pliakas, former director of farmer cooperatives.

### VOIOTIA

Spyros Floros, lawyer.

### GREVENA

Kostas Saripapas, former monarch.

### EVVOCIA

Katerina Papakonstantinou, housewife; Dimitrios Pleionis, private employee.

### EVRYTANIA

S. Kallioras.

### ILEIA

Loukia Kalogeropoulou; Georgios Karameros, retired brigadier general.

### THESPROTIA

Kimitrios Koutsokostas, civil engineer.

### IOANNINA

Vasileios Kappis, lawyer; Ioannis Farmas, former Greek Tourist Organization director; Georgios Toskas, journalist.

KARDITSA

Andonios Papadopoulos, retired officer; Christos Christodoulou, veterinarian.

KEFALLINIA

Stylianos Simitzis, retired brigadier general.

KOZANI

Georgios Konstandinidis, lawyer.

KORINTHIA

Dimitrios Andoniou, retired major general; Themistoklis Kyriakopoulos, retired major general; Konstantinos Negris, lawyer.

KYKLADES /Islands/

Vasileios Kalavros, property owner.

LAKONIA

Spyros Tzinieris.

LARISA

Georgios Douvalopoulos, former minister.

LESVOS

Georgios Vogiatzis, lawyer; Eleftherios Katsanis, private employee.

LEVKAS

Christos Doukatas, entrepreneur.

MAGNISIA

Christos Griziotis, dentist; Apostolos Zambalos, entrepreneur; Panagiotis Keutseukos, retired officer; Athanasios Hisdas, property owner; Vasiliki Paikoudi, housewife.

MESSINIA

Aristeidis Albanis, merchant; Dimitrios Nikolitseas, journalist, Emmanuil Nikolopoulos, former monarch, lawyer; Ioannis Xidopoulos, former minister, lawyer; Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos, lawyer; Nikitas Polykhronopoulos, retired lieutenant general; Eleftherios Totsis.

FIRST PIRAEUS

Theodoros Kyragiannis, entrepreneur; Konstandinos Panagiotakos, former minister, ambassador; Emmanouil Pergamalis, shipbuilder.

PREVEZA

Dimitrios Liondos, Cities Police deputy chief.

TRIKALA

Sotirios Pelesiotis, retired brigadier general; Khristos Papamikhail, farmer; Ioannis Tassias, lawyer.

FTHIOTIS

Khristos Karaiskos, lawyer; Nikolaos Laspias, tax expert; Evangelos Papastavrou, retired officer.

FLORINA

Andreas Metallidis, assistant professor; Lazaros Mostakis, teacher.

FOKIS

Panagiotis Kakanas, technician.

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CSO: 4621/7

POLITICAL

GREECE

DEMOCRATIC UNION ANNOUNCES PLATFORM

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 17 Sep 81 p 7

Text In a joint press conference yesterday, Party of Democratic Socialism KODISO Chairman I. Pesmazoglou and Agrarian and Workers' Party KAE Chairman Al. Baltazis announced the platform of the Democratic Union KODISO-KAE merged. The platform's preamble states the following:

"The Democratic Union DE is struggling for a just, progressive and dignified society based on the principles of socialism and democracy.

"In the 18 October 1981 elections DE sees the timely, historic moment for terminating the long sovereignty of the single-party rule by the Right and of the reactionary forces; it sees the path opening for progress and justice, for the establishment of a new social understanding and the consolidation of democracy in new institutions for the protection of the citizens and human rights. To safeguard progress toward democratic socialism it is necessary to have a government of change based on democratic cooperation and broad popular consent. Only thus will democratic stability be ensured. The state's prestige will be restored domestically. The trust in the political leadership will be consolidated. The country's international standing will be strengthened. And the Greeks will create conditions for achieving a better life.

"For this great social change, for opening the path toward democratic socialism, the Greek people will cooperate with their natural allies, all European workers."

The text of the platform includes in part:

1. Democratization of the State. The present state of the Right is the greatest obstacle to democratic socialistic reforms. A basic prerequisite for reforming the institutions is the existence of a state of trust. The guardianship exercised on the social life by the state-party relationship must be terminated.

The control of the state machine must be exercised by local agencies representing all social forces. Decentralization and participation in the decision-making process are the main levers for the state's democratizations.

Believing in the need for national reconciliation we ask that the National Resistance of all Greeks who fought the conquerors be recognized.

Our basic demands for cleansing the country's political life are:

- a. Establishment of a permanent electoral system based on the simple proportional.
  - b. The state radio and television should guarantee equal appearance and treatment of the parties.
  - c. The campaign expenses of parties and candidates should be controlled; the functional expenses of parties should be subsidized by the state.
  - d. Democratization and modernization of the Chamber of Deputies' regulations; the role of the chamber in the state's operation should be elevated.
2. Modernization of the State Machine. The revamping of the state machine does not mean only rational organization. It must be outside the influence of the parties; favoritism by leaders must be eliminated; and the use of the state authority for serving personal interests should stop.

3. National Foreign Policy. The basic axis of Greek foreign policy must be its European orientation which is in line with the social transformation, the development and the progress of the country.

Greece, a permanent member of the European community, is strengthening its international position and broadens the field for the development of relations with the East European, Balkan and Arab world.

The NATO-Greece relationship should be monitored on a permanent basis in order to ascertain if it is in line with our national interest.

The operational control of the Aegean air and sea space by the Greek Armed Forces is of vital importance for the security of all Greece. This is a decisive point in our relations with NATO and it is indispensably connected to the operation of foreign bases in our country. The foreign bases now operating in our country must be subject to full and meaningful national control until conditions make their removal possible. Safeguarding our national sovereignty and integrity in the Aegean and coping with Turkish expansionism dictate a high level of defensive ability and additional financial burden.

We declare the full support and cooperation of Greece with the Republic of Cyprus.

4. Social and Economic Development. Economic development is not a goal in itself, cut off from the people.

We believe in the need to use to best advantage human labor in an economic organization of different quality--an economy which will support a different quality of life.

We are struggling for a new agrarian reformation which will provide:

Support of the family property and the safeguarding of the family cultivations with modern, viable farm products. We are basically against any schemes which

would change the free Greek producers into sharecroppers with the bureaucrats as their new bosses.

The basic element of the industrialization policy will be the social control which will be exercised with the participation of the elected representatives of workers and employees; the anti-democratic laws which limit free unionism will be abolished.

The merchant marine is a dynamic avant garde to the economic development of our country. A central objective for its development is the programmed and subsidized renewal of our merchant fleet; the assistance to modern shipbuilding and repairing industry; the complete improvement of work conditions; and improvement of seamen's compensation.

The public sector is the decisive lever for the developmental policy. It is necessary to activate it in four main sectors: public works, energy, transportation-communication and banks.

5. Social Justice. Social justice means full and just compensation of work, social security, social housing and social health. For this reason the working people must participate in the decisions which concern work conditions, social insurance and health institutions and social housing.

The income policy, in conjunction with a fair price policy must ensure not only social insurance but also the social daily wage which includes social insurance, housing and social health.

Our objective is to establish a national health program which will offer free health services to the people. It is imperative that a National Insurance Program be established under a single agency which will satisfy the aforementioned services. The implementation of the national program for free health services by the state and for a just social insurance will be gradual.

6. Education--Culture--Environment. The education of free men starts before the official education program. Education is not limited to providing knowledge. On the contrary, it aims at general learning and character building. The main objective in the area of culture is for the people to participate actively in the cultural functions. The role of elected representatives on a central and decentral level will be essential so that the tradition of all civilization sources in our country may be combined with the development of new intellectual values and riches.

It is necessary to protect the natural and man-made environment which is being damaged by irresponsible private interests but also by the criminal indifference of the state.

Regarding to questions by reporters Pesmazoglou and Baltazis stressed, in part:

a. There is absolute ideological and political KODISO-KAE identification and the organizational unification will be effected after the elections.

b. Change is not an issue for one party alone but should be based on a broader popular consent.

c. DE has a clear anti-Right position, but cannot exclude in advance any post-electoral cooperation with any party which ideologically and by its deeds proves its devotion to a democratic state of many parties.

d. The equal treatment of all parties by TV is a question of implementing the constitution. The PASOK-ND agreement for TV telecasts strengthens polarization.

Pesmazoglou and Baltazis will tour the largest cities of Greece. Next Sunday the first will speak in Pyrgos, on 4 October in Salonica and on 14 October in Athens.

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CSO: 4621/7

## ELECTION COSTS PROJECTED

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek No 684 10-16 Sep 81 p 82

[Article by Ap. Strongylis: "Public Cost of 18 October 1981 Elections to Exceed One Billion Drachmas; Parties and Candidates Will Spend Large Amounts.]

[Text] Everything has its price and so do elections whose costs, moreover, are paid by "two pockets"--by the state (expenses for holding them) and by the parties and candidates whose expenses are mostly for propaganda and--unfortunately for Greece--for bribing...consciences. It is not easy to establish the extent and sources of such bribing nor is the function of this article to find out. The fact remains, however, that according to various accusations a lot of money is spent in this direction.

## 100 Percent Increase

The elections for representatives to the Chamber of Deputies and for Eurodeputies will be held on 18 October. Their cost is estimated at 1.3 billion drachmas or at double the amount spent in the 1977 elections. This 100 percent increase could be attributed to the price index [rise] and could somehow be used as an argument to justify the demand for a readjustment of salaries, services, etc. It could also be said that this high cost is due perhaps to the known tactic of increasing the public expenditures and waste. Anyway, the appropriate authorities hasten to explain that the rise in the [elections] costs is due to a) the increase in the number of election districts, b) the increase in the number of judicial election monitors, and c) the introduction modern technological methods for conducting elections.

## For Greater Convenience?

The total number of election districts and monitors for the 18 October elections are as follows compared to the 1977 elections:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Election Districts</u>	<u>Judicial Monitors</u>
1977	13,100	14,000
1981	18,500	20,000

or an increase in election districts by 5,400 (about 50 percent) and in the number of judicial monitors by about the same percentage. With regard to the number of voters the picture appears as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Voters</u>
1977	6,403,738
1981	6,920,000

or an increase of voters by 516,262. Those born between 1957 and 1967, or five new ages, are added this year to the list of voters. These ages (140,000 voters each) give a total of 700,000 new voters. But since death--a man's fate--takes about 40,000 persons each year, the actual increase is about 500,000.

The state will spend this year 1.3 billion drachmas. Let us hope then that there will be greater convenience, that the lines and hardships of voters will be eliminated and that the introduction of technological method will result in uneventful elections and in a speedy announcement of the results.

#### The Eurodeputies

Does EEC participate in the cost for the election of deputies to the European Parliament? It does not--neither directly by paying some bills nor indirectly by advertising the parliament and what it means to the voters. The whole EEC effort is limited to the distribution by the Athens European Council Office of Information of one or two brochures (one in 150,000 copies and the other with a report on Public Power Corporation accounts [sic]).

The law compels the municipalities to participate in the election costs by preparing at their expense wall frames where posters can be glued. But due to their poor financial condition the municipalities do not seem to be able to fulfill this obligation. The Athens municipality, however, will spend 5 million drachmas for the preparation of 500 wall spaces for 8 posters each--one for each party.

#### Other Expenditures

The other expenses by parties and candidates are not yet known--they may never be completely known. Before and after the elections, however, each party provides an expense report.

The advertising costs of the parties in the 1977 campaign (expenses, that is, for advertisements in the press and for posters--the only expenses that can be accounted for as the newspaper TO VIMA reports) are as follows:

<u>Party</u>	<u>Total Expenses in Drachmas</u>
New Democracy	22,428,776
Democratic Center Union	5,534,210
Liberal Party	4,485,067
National Array	4,014,077

PASOK	2,016,212
Alliance	<u>537,125</u>
Total	38,015,467

The above expenses represent only part of the total party campaign expenses (for printed matter, headquarters, posters, transportation, rallies, etc.) To VIMA reports also that this year "it is estimated that ND will spend between 300 and 700 million drachmas, PASOK around 105 million drachmas and the rest of the parties lesser amounts."

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CSO: 4621/109

## ILICAK EXAMINES NAP SEPARATISM

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 22 Aug 81 pp 1, 15

[Commentary by TERCUMAN columnist Nazli Ilicak on legal aspects of the NAP trial]

[Text] The trial of the NAP began on 19 August. Our friends who are following the proceedings report that the atmosphere is very tense. Among the saddening brushstrokes in a tragic picture are the facts that the NAP's chairman is not well, that NAP deputies are sent to trial loaded into enclosed vehicles, and that large numbers of military personnel surround the accused in the courtroom.

The NAP case is very important because it is a political party that is being put on trial. A political party means hundreds of thousands of votes, hundreds of thousands of people who have given their hearts to that party.

Political parties, described as essential elements of a democracy, have been set specific limits by the constitution of the Turkish Republic. In Turkey, the multi-party democratic way of life proscribes opposition to the system of government, permitting only opposition to a given administration. The 57th article of the constitution foresees that "parties whose rules and regulations, programs, and activities do not conform to the principles of the democratic and secular republic, and to the fundamental rule of the indivisibility of the state, its territory, and its people, shall be closed down permanently."

There is great similarity between the 57th article of our constitution and the 21st article of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. The German federal constitution makes clear that "political parties may be closed down by the supreme constitutional court if it is established that they have come out in opposition to the free and democratic system, as judged by their aims or by the attitude of their members." On the other hand, in many countries communist and fascist parties, enemies of the regime, have been allowed to function freely. In England, Spain, and Canada, even political parties representing various regions and seeking autonomy or independence for these regions are operating openly. In Canada, for example, Levesque, who seeks independence for Quebec, participates in elections openly stating these views. There are also political organizations which have a connection with terrorism. Some political parties representing Spain's Basque region (Herri Batasuna, Euskadiko Eskerra) are openly connected with the terrorist ETA organization. In the same way, the H-Block Party, representing the Catholics of Northern Ireland, ran an imprisoned IRA member as its candidate in the last by-election.

Every country, in accordance with its own circumstances, takes steps to delineate the boundaries of existing freedoms. We believe that it is very natural for Turkey to define the limits of democracy as coming to an end at the line of terror and opposition to the regime. In the NAP case it will be examined whether or not this political party has pursued its activities within these established legal boundaries. However, the case has long since gone beyond the question of whether or not a political party is to be closed down, to the point where a large number of human lives have been placed under threat by the demand for the imposition of the death penalty. According to the indictment, the NAP is a national socialist, fascist party, preparing an uprising by arming the people at large, and working towards the goal of changing the form of government by a forcible seizure of power. Therefore the prosecutor is demanding the application of several articles of the Turkish Penal Code, chiefly articles 141, 146, and 149.

The 141st article punishes those who "establish associations having goals opposed to the republican form of government or to the principles of democracy, and having as their aim the administration of the government by a single individual or class." The 149th article punishes those who "arm the people and incite them to rebellion and bloodshed." The application of the 146th article is demanded as a natural consequence of articles 141 and 149: "Since the NAP is a party which has as its goal a dictatorship and the wholesale destruction of the state's political and legal institutions (Turkish Penal Code §141), and has armed the people in order to achieve this goal (Turkish Penal Code §149), its leaders have committed the crime of forcibly attempting to change, alter, and abolish the constitution (Turkish Penal Code §146)."

When an accusation is made imputing a crime of such magnitude, a crime punishable by execution, it is essential that the proofs be laid out openly, and that it be shown that each accused individually attempted by force to change, alter, or abolish the constitution.

#### Two Points from the Indictment

Because we are concerned by the possibility that we may affect a trial in progress, we will not dwell upon some matters in the indictment which have caught our eye. Yet, we cannot refrain from touching upon two points which aren't directly connected with the accused. Page 206 of the indictment contains the following lines:

"Former NAP Senator Niyazi Unsal's letter sent on 26 November 1977 to Arif Tekin contains the sentence: 'Those people whom we have released from prison hesitate to approach us; even while people who have been sentenced to terms exceeding six months by just one day cannot remain in government service, I have had men who were sentenced to fifteen years, to four and a half years, appointed to teaching positions.' This sentence shows the illegal and appalling efforts in a manner that needs no explanation and lays them bare before our eyes."

Since the prosecutor did not know that Niyazi Unsal was a member of the RPP, he wanted to use the letter as proof against the NAP. Such a major mistake in such an important case may give rise to doubts concerning other documents in the indictment.

Above all, the wholesale condemnation of all rightists on page 884, at a time when calm and reason ought to be the rule, is of a manner that is bound to give rise to questions in our minds.

Page 884 of the indictment states the following: "Rightism, which is synonymous with conservatism and reaction, is a system of thought that opposes innovation and defends the status quo. It rests on the belief that everything remains the same and that nothing will ever change. Because of this, it is opposed to the left, which arose after the French revolution seeking evolutionary change. A view that has as its aim the continuation of the existing system with a reorganization and some social proposals can be called, up to a point, a right-wing socialism."

The fact that the prosecutor espouses a world view which equates rightism and conservatism with reaction and opposition to progress has saddened and offended us.

The 11 September military intervention did not take the path of extraordinary courts and has respected the principles of ordinary justice. Our greatest wish is that this fine beginning not be damaged in the course of the case, and that a just verdict be handed down, a verdict that will satisfy the majority of the people.

Since the evidence has been established, and since the possibilities for destroying evidence have been removed, barring other objections the release of the accused from detention for the duration of the trial would be a development much to be desired.

410  
Case 1654/151

## FURTHER CHARGES AGAINST NATIONALIST ACTION PARTY READ

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 26 Aug 81 p 9

[Report on the reading of the indictment in the NAP trial: "The Commandos Committed Burglaries and Robberies in Order to Obtain Funds"]

[Text] Ankara, 26 August--MILLIYET--The case against the NAP and its associated organizations continued yesterday with the start of the reading of the indictment. His five-day medical certificate having come to an end, Turkes was also present at the proceedings. At the same time, the accused NAP members held at the Language School were brought to the court hearing in buses having curtain-covered windows.

After the start of the proceedings a number of individuals asked to join in the suit as intervening parties. These included the wife and two daughters of Kemal Turkler, the former general chairman of DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions] who was murdered in Istanbul, along with their attorneys; the wife of Security Chief Cevat Yurdakul, who was murdered in Adana, and her attorneys; the mother, father, and brother of Orhan Yesil Bircan, murdered in Haskoy in Ankara, and their attorneys; the wife of attorney Halil Sitki Gulluoglu, murdered in Adana, and her attorneys; the mother of Huseyin Cavit Cevik, murdered in Ankara, and her attorneys; Ibrahim Kurmu and Kiymet Fadime Bastug, wounded as a result of a bomb thrown into their house in Ankara, and their attorneys. Upon these requests the members of the court conferred among each other and decided to allow the above mentioned applicants and their attorneys to parttake in the proceedings as intervening parties.

On the other hand, the application of the attorney engaged by the court-appointed administrators acting on behalf of the RPP to join the case as attorney for an intervening party was rejected by the members of the court. The grounds given for this refusal were that the administrators appointed to run the RPP had no authority in this matter.

After Trial Judge Ozlenirler read the decision permitting the attorneys for the intervening parties to enter the courtroom, twenty intervening attorneys, including among them Hasan Fehmi Gunes, Emin Deger, Ersan Sansal, and Nusret Senem, took their places in the courtroom.

At 10:45 am the military prosecutor, Air Force Colonel Judge Nurettin Soyer, began the reading of the indictment in the NAP case. At this time copies of the indictment were distributed in the courtroom to 46 of the accused who had not yet received the indictment.

#### The Indictment Is Read

Military Prosecutor Soyer stated that the investigation had established the fact that a centralist, organized, and totalitarian armed society had been formed within the NAP and its affiliates, the idealist associations, and that this group had armed the Turkish people against one another, and had incited and directed them towards mass murder.

He explained that following the 12 September 1980 military intervention the central offices of all political parties had been searched on orders of the National Security Council, and that after obtaining evidence upon which the investigation has been based, the National Security Council had made a legal recommendation directing the Ankara Martial Law Command to conduct an investigation, upon which a preliminary investigation was begun. He further stated the following:

"As a result of the preliminary investigation, confronted with the evidence obtained and the statements of the accused and witnesses, it has been established that under the guise of legality the NAP and its affiliates, the various idealist associations, had formed within them a centralist, organized, and totalitarian armed society on a nationwide scale; that it had divided the citizenry into two groups, characterizing them in a one-sided manner by calling them either idealists or communists; that it had armed the Turkish people against one another, making use of specially trained individuals; that it had incited and directed them towards mass murder; that it had spread the impression that the existing authorities were incapable of ensuring public safety, and that instead it had attempted to forcibly overturn the constitutional system, with the aim of placing the government of the state in the hands of a single individual, which is contrary to the principles of republicanism and democracy."

After this, the military prosecutor went on to outline the ideology of the organization and the historical development of similar ideological trends over time. He pointed to the existence of similarities between the views of the NAP and the Nazi parties, and touched upon some documents found in the central offices of the NAP.

The military prosecutor explained that the extreme left had organized rapidly by taking advantage of the rights and freedoms brought by the 1961 constitution, and that the already extant right wing had also developed into activists and had grown to a scale that should not be minimized. The military prosecutor went on to say that by their efforts in the direction of activism, the followers of the idealist viewpoint had played a very influential role in bringing about the level of anarchy prevalent prior to 12 September. He stated that the NAP, beginning in 1969, had opened camps for the physical and mental training and direction of naive individuals who were sympathetic to its ideas, with the purpose of creating cadres that would dominate the public sector and would be effective in the streets.

The military prosecutor also stated that the idealists had undertaken efforts to form legal and extralegal organizations, to procure arms, and to form cadres, by following rules similar to those used by leftist elements. He added that these efforts, aimed at systematically and consciously gaining control of the streets, educational institutions, public and private organizations and establishments, various places of employment, and the state, had gone on continuously until 12 September 1980.

He further stated that the idealists had pursued their efforts with much more secrecy and attention to detail following the proclamation of martial law in 1978 until 12 September 1980. The military prosecutor explained that the idealists had selected certain individuals as their targets for actions to be carried out when circumstances were favorable, that the rightists had increased the scale of their armed actions with the aim of creating fear and panic, and that they had played an active and effective role in events that were turned into communal clashes based on sectarian differences.

#### Burglaries and Robberies

Supporters of the idealist side, in addition to their armed actions, increasingly turned to illegal methods of obtaining funds, such as burglaries and armed robberies, said the military prosecutor, who also revealed the existence of powerful evidence showing that the idealists were involved in a large number of robberies of jewelry stores, bank branches, workplaces, and dwellings during the period from 1978 to 1980.

The military prosecutor went on to say that from 1973 to the present the idealists had undertaken planned organizing activities, which they pursued by setting up central and regional organizations outside of the party structure. The prosecutor disclosed the names of the organizations founded for this purpose.

#### DOCTOR KANNAPIN AND AN OFFICER OF THE SS

The prosecutor, touching upon the NAP's foreign connections, stated that party inspector Enver Altayli, in one of the reports he wrote for Turkes, made mention of an individual named Dr. Kannapin and of a certain SS officer. An example from Altayli's letter was cited:

"The books you sent me will come in very handy for the efforts I am about to undertake in this matter. At the present time we are in the process of preparing a brochure which we will print in an edition of 2000 copies. Dr. Kannapin will write it himself. Part of its contents has already been settled on, the rest will be established in a meeting we will have in the course of the next few days. On 4 May 1976 Dr. Lann Kannapin will come to Cologne. Here he will introduce me to the chief of the Turkish desk of the German internal intelligence agency. According to information given to me by Dr. Kannapin, this individual is a CDU member and a former German officer. He is said to be an intelligent anticomunist. I asked Dr. Kannapin how it is that so much negative material could be written about us. He said, and I am giving you his exact words, 'Our people get their information on this subject from the MIT [National Intelligence Organization]. In this matter what is needed is that the MIT's ears be boxed, not our people's.'

Provided the MIT gives our people the correct information, provided they say it isn't so, then our people will write the right things.' Faruk Bey had Dr. Kannapin invited to the Turkish sector of Cyprus for a one-week visit. I had Faruk Bey give Dr. Kannapin return airplane tickets as a present. His expenses for hotels, meals, etc. for a week will be met by Turkish Airlines through the good offices of our friend. Dr. Kannapin will leave by air from Frankfurt on 7 July, remain in Cyprus for one week, and will be in Ankara between 15 July and 22 July. It would be good if people there would occupy themselves with him. The problem is to make foreigners believe that in the future we will be a major political force in Turkey. According to a personal communication from Dr. Kengerli, chief labor counselor at the German Embassy in Ankara, Dr. Mehmet Kengerli is an Azerbaijani. In 1940 he was captured by the Germans. Subsequently he served in their Turkestan Legion. (In the Turkestan Legion, although he was an Azerbaijani) he was an SS officer during the war. At the end of the war he had the rank of major. He is very sympathetic towards us. He won't refuse any of our requests. He even takes care of the most minor problems of our idealist friends. He has made positive efforts on our behalf at the German Trade Union Federation (DGB). However he has not been able to succeed in this. The diplomats are working against us. Kengerli's positive efforts are being frustrated by these people. A report, copies of which I am enclosing, has been obtained from a Turkestani who is of our race and is employed by a foreign government service known to you. Since Dr. Kannapin is on leave, we could not obtain it by that channel. However, I also learned the existence of this report, which is the cause of a friendly atmosphere in the German government towards us, from this individual. That means the documents are genuine, not forged."

#### TURKES PUT ALTAYLI ON THE PAYROLL

According to the revelations of the military prosecutor, Alparslan Turkes wrote the following in a letter to Enver Altayli, who was in Germany:

"I know that the efforts you are engaged in take up all of your time and leave you no possibility of working in another profession. What is essential is that you should continue your activities, which are very useful for our cause, without wearing yourself out in the midst of financial difficulties to the point that you won't be able to work anymore. For this reason, in order to ensure your living expenses, you will be able to draw 2000 DM each month from my personal account at the Koln BFG. With best wishes for success, I send you my greetings and regards."

#### ASSOCIATIONS ABROAD

The military prosecutor gave examples of the organizing activities of the idealists abroad. He said that their organizations abroad had formed a federation known as the Turkish Federation, having 103 member associations, of which 86 were in West Germany. 7 in Belgium, 6 in the Netherlands, 3 in France, and the others active in Austria and Switzerland.

In the afternoon session of the trial the reading of the 945-page indictment was continued.

## AN ARGUMENT BREAKS OUT

As the military prosecutor, Air Force Colonel Judge Nurettin Soyer, was reading the indictment aloud, he read the phrase "former NAP Senator Niyazi Unsal," occurring in a document on page 206 of the indictment, as "former RPP Senator Niyazi Unsal." The accused and their attorneys voiced objections to this emendation. Some attorneys spoke up, saying, "Why RPP and not NAP," and said he had misread the indictment.

At the same time, Turkes shouted out "RPP" even while prosecutor Soyer was also saying RPP. As for the attorneys, they were shouting, "Read it correctly, read it correctly!" Turkes also said, "You wrote it in the form NAP senator."

Thereupon Military Prosecutor Soyer spoke up, saying, "We are making an emendation," upon which there was an uproar from among the attorneys. Soyer went on to say, "We can explicate and amend the indictment verbally at any time. This is my legal prerogative."

At this point, Alparslan Turkes asked to be allowed to speak. Granted permission, he advanced to the witness box reserved for the accused in an agitated manner, and while doing so dropped the copy of the indictment from his hand. After bending down to pick it up, he said, "We were brought here by a 945-page indictment which consists of slander and forgery from beginning to end, on the basis of which the prosecution demands the death penalty. The prosecution, which in this indictment has attributed to us a very crudely written letter that was the work of a senator from another party, has also presented it to public opinion in this way, and this is also the way the press has published it. Then the prosecution says, 'I have made an emendation.' However the prosecution hasn't officially informed us of this fact."

After this at the hearing, Nuri Erogan, one of the attorneys for the accused, asked whether there had been an investigation of Niyazi Unsal by the prosecutor's office and entered an official complaint against Unsal. Some attorneys for the defense also demanded to know what RPP Senator Niyazi Unsal had to do with the case against the NAP.

Upon these accusations, Military Prosecutor Soyer spoke up, saying, "This preliminary investigation was prepared by six prosecutors. We don't know what party Niyazi Unsal belongs to. We are not politicians. This letter, bearing the letter-head of the Senate of the Republic and Niyazi Unsal's signature, was found on Turkes's desk. Why hasn't he made an official denunciation in connection with this letter until the present moment?"

At this point, Turkes once again asked for permission to speak, and when this was granted by the presiding judge, he said, "The prosecution is at a loss in this case. It has prepared this writ of indictment carelessly. The prosecution has admitted this here. It is a very sad state of affairs for Turkish justice if this most distinguished committee of prosecutors, charged with investigating a case of such vital importance, does not know what party the senator called Niyazi Unsal belongs to, and then prepares an indictment in which this man, who is an RPP senator, is called a member of the NAP, all the while asking for the heads of half of the defendants. These words of his have been entered into the record, thereby

establishing the level of carelessness of the committee of prosecutors, and the prejudiced and ignorant manner in which this investigation has been conducted. The fact that this matter has been brought to your honors' attention will be important in your reaching verdicts that will vindicate justice."

9620

CSO: 4654/151

**SUBWAY SYSTEM'S TUNNELS TO SERVE AS CIVIL-DEFENSE SHELTERS**

Helsinki HUVVUDTADSBLADET in Swedish 6 Sep 81 p 9

[Article by Thure Malmberg: "City's Air-Raid Shelters Get 81,000 Beds"]

[Text] The Association for the Protection of the Population of the city of Helsinki is now taking bids on apartment-type beds which hold 4 people. But they are not talking about just a few individual beds, but beds for tens of thousands of people--81,000 people in the city's general shelters alone.

Where automobiles are parked in the Parliament Garage on Nervandersgatan at present, for example, there is to be space for a total of 12,000 people, each of them having 1.2 square meters of floor space. The garage is to be changed into an effective shelter for the population within 24 hours. That is twice the average for older shelters, but it pays to be generous with space in rock shelters; more space for each person causes a reduction in the need for air conditioning and cooling. In that way, the space taken up by engine rooms and the energy and air for large diesel motors which drive the power units are saved.

**Fifty-Four Percent Will Have Space**

At present, Helsinki can offer shelter space to approximately 54 percent of those who work and live there. It is believed that everybody will have space in the mid-1980's, but the city's population chief, Colonel Olavi Kettunen, is skeptical.

"We probably will not achieve that goal within the foreseeable future," he says. "Just last year Mayor Ilaskivi said that 100,000 commuters from neighboring communities would not get space in shelters in Helsinki--even though, in practice, one naturally cannot break people down according to home districts later on, in an emergency situation."

"However, a lot has been accomplished unobtrusively during recent years," Bank Director Kalevi Tilli, the chairman of the Helsinki Association for the Protection of the Population, a volunteer citizens' organization, comments.

"Take the subway stations, for example," he says. "There we have five fine shelters with pressure-proof doors and equipped conforming to the same stiff standards as apply to the Tempelplatsen rock shelter. Furthermore, those subway

stations are at about the same depth of 20 to 25 meters under the primary rock."

Colonel Kettunen comments that this is deep enough so that the people would survive a nuclear explosion in the air above the shelter.

#### A Depth of 100 Meters Required for Direct Hits

"But if it is a surface explosion within a radius of 1 kilometer from the shelter, not even 25 meters of rock will suffice. Then 100 meters are needed, and population shelters of that kind have not yet been built here," he says.

A great deal is going on in the area of shelter for the population just now. The ordering of beds is only one example, although gigantic amounts of money are involved. The fact is that they are calculating in terms of an approximate price of 150 marks per bed, and thus the idea is that four people will lie one above the other where automobiles are parked or warehouses are located now.

This fall Helsinki's territorial breakdown is to be reviewed, and it is believed that the city management will decide to make a new breakdown in October which will result in fewer districts and a new centralization. Of the five subway stations, only Hagnas is actually ready for use as a protective shelter at present, but the other four are to be able to function in that capacity when traffic gets going next year.

In Helsinki, people really observe the adaptation of the subway to the mission of protecting the population with pride; planning has gone hand in hand, right from the start, they say.

#### Successful Adaptation of the Subway

When we hurry across the Hagnas market place at present, there is scarcely anyone who thinks of the fact that, in a critical situation, 4,000 people will be able to get space underground and live there for up to 2 weeks, if necessary. Earth closets for 134 people are already ready to be installed; here the strategists have calculated that one tub will suffice for 30 people. The compartment is completely marked out on the floor in a long space 24 meters under the Hagnas market hall, but the walls have not yet been put up. Two gigantic fresh-water tanks are also ready to be filled with 120 cubic meters of drinking water if there is danger of an alarm. That is intended to suffice for water consumption of 3 liters per individual each day.

#### Store Food for an Emergency Situation!

"However, we do not have a stockpile of food," says graduate engineer Seppo Toivonen, the subway system's population protection expert, "but we do have space, on the other hand, for the shipments the city can deliver. Instead, we are expecting the people to take along enough of their own food for 3 or 4 days. The main thing is for there to be water; one can do without food for a week."

engineer Raimo Suomio, an assistant department chief in the planning department of the subway system, says "Even the platforms can become shelter space, if needed.

"Normally, we expect to have 24 hours to prepare for war, and during that period of time we can manage to put things in order," Suomio says. "But we can lock the big, pressure-proof, 16-ton doors up to the street in just a little over a minute, if that is necessary.

"They slide up out of the floor hydraulically, and if there should be a failure of the machinery they can even be cranked up by hand, although that naturally takes a long time," he says.

The subway station shelter areas will be a third cheaper to build than conventional shelter areas. Even the subway tunnels and train traffic could possibly be used if the rest of Helsinki were contaminated by a nuclear bomb explosion, but that possibility has not yet been investigated sufficiently.

At present, it is assumed that each station will be closed off hermetically with big, semicircular, pressure-proof doors made of steel which are dropped down over the entrances and locked.

"The doors over the rails are secured with two pillars so that they cannot be dropped down in front of a train by mistake," says graduate engineer Toivonen. "Furthermore, the automatic control apparatus is designed in such a way that the train stops automatically if a door should be lowered."

In all, the Helsinki subway system has 20 such tunnel doors. The Hagnas hall platform provides both space and capacity: it is 150 meters long, approximately 20 meters wide and approximately 8 meters high. There are no facilities for heating, but as in all shelters it is the danger of overheating, instead, which is a problem; thousands of tightly-packed people produce a lot of heat. However, it is expected that the rocky walls will absorb the heat.

#### Space for 16,740 People in the Subway

The other subway stations with shelter space are Kampen (space for 3,500), Brunnsgatan (space for 3,000), Gloet (space for 3,000) and Sornas (space for 3,240). In all, that means that there is shelter space for 16,740 people in the subway system alone, and if the system is extended that will become a total of 23,040.

If those stations had not been built with protection of the population in mind, the city would have been forced to build separate shelters in the vicinity, which would have been considerably more expensive, they point out in the offices of the subway system. The fact is that these stations are located in the densely-populated areas of the inner city, where a great many people move around.

#### Secrecy Becoming Stricter and Stricter

The underground spaces in Helsinki are becoming more and more extensive. At the same time, secrecy regarding the most important shelters, where the country's

highest-ranking leaders will be protected during a crisis, is increasing. In the same way, it is hard to even get into the national telecommunications organization's gigantic rock shelter under Observatory Mountain.

Theoretically, Helsinki ought to look like a big Swiss cheese from Observatory Mountain, with the Sveaborg tunnel as an offshoot in the southeast--to the parliament building with its underground hall for plenary sessions and on up to the city's own central shelter for the population in Kottby. Moreover, the parliament's underground halls are closed to the press.

The government also sits underground, if necessary, and primary rock is also used under Skatudden.

On the whole, it was the good bedrock which gave Helsinki an excellent chance to have good underground shelters for the population. The usual depth is 20 meters, but experts stress that this is not enough for a nuclear detonation on the surface. Then at least 100 meters are required if one is to survive at a distance of 1 kilometer from the detonation.

#### More Axes Needed

In the Helsinki Association for the Protection of the Population, they are concerned over the fact that many brick houses continue to lack equipment--spades, axes, crowbars, etc.

Additional efforts are required in this connection, and especially in the older houses. Nevertheless, it is said that Helsinki perhaps has better rock shelters than any other capital city in Europe.




Long rows of earth closets are ready to be put in place in the Hagnas subway station shelter for the population. The subway system's protection expert, Seppo Toivonen, lifts the lid and determines that the plastic bags are in position. Photo: Bert Carpelan.



The solid door which Bank Director Tilli is opening here leads to a lateral lock chamber. Five minutes after an alarm, the large, semicircular, pressure-proof doors are locked, and after that people are taken into the shelter through lateral lock chambers, where they also can be cleansed of radioactive waste by showering.  
Photo: Bert Carpelan.



In a crisis, 4,000 people can be accommodated on the platform in the Hagnas subway station, which is 150 meters long. Earth closets with 134 seats are on hand, fresh-water tanks are ready to be filled with a two-week water requirement and beds will be ordered this fall. Photo: Bert Carpelan.



The subway stations can be shut off from the tunnels in a moment by gigantic, semicircular, pressure-proof doors. From left to right in the door opening are the subway system's protection chief, Seppo Toivonen, and the assistant chief of planning, Raimo Suomio. Photo: Bert Carpelan.

9266  
CSO: 3109/249

## NEW GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN POST ANNOUNCED

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 19 Sep 81 p 1

[Text] President Kyprianou has chosen Mr Panos Ioannou, a teacher by profession, to be the new government spokesman. He will take up his duties on October 1.

Mr Ioannou, a native of the now occupied Varosha town, aged 54, is at present a teacher at the English School. He is married and has two children.

He is a Bachelor of Arts (BA) of the University of Wales and has a fluent knowledge of Greek, English and French.

He attended a producer's course at the BBC and from 1965 to 1973 he was a programme assistant with the BBC external services. He also served as translator and coordinator at the Council of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

Mr Ioannou was a master at the English School of Nicosia from 1948 to 1959, served as a master at Edgware and Hendon County Schools in London from 1959 to 1964 and until 1973 was a member of the London University GCE Examining Board.

He returned to the English School in Nicosia in 1973 where he has served until now.

The office of the government spokesman was previously held by the Public Information Director Mr Miltiades Christodoulou who combined the two functions and was in office for 10 years.

Mr Christodoulou resigned last June amid rumours of mismanagement and the Council of Ministers decided to separate the two functions of Public Information Director and of government spokesman.

It was announced last week that Mr Christodoulou, now in Germany, is facing charges of obtaining money by false pretences and similar counts, which he denied and said he will refute in court.

CSO: 4600/16

**BRITISH REFUSE TO RENEW RESIDENCE PERMITS**

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 29 Aug 81 pp 1,8

[Text] The Home Office in London refuses to renew the residence permits of Greek Cypriot refugees, several thousand of whom face the possibility of immediate deportation.

According to our reports from London, one of the excuses given to these refugees for the Home Office action is that "there exist reasonable indications that they will return to their homes [in Turkish occupied territory]. The British authorities have started refusing the renewal of residence permits for the last 3 months. During this period 1,500 to 1,600 Greek Cypriot refugees who applied to the Home Office were given a negative answer. After such refusal, those affected have the right to appeal to the courts but the chances for a reversal of the negative decision are minimal.

**Other Information**

According to an article in the CYPRUS WEEKLY--published in English--the excuse of the Home Office for deporting the refugees is that normal conditions have now been established in Cyprus and, therefore, the refugees will have no difficulty settling in areas controlled by the state.

The article states also that originally 10,000 refugees went to England following the occupation of the northern sector of Cyprus by the Turks. Most of them, however, have left gradually and only around 2,000 remain in England today.

**Temporary Residence**

The British government did not grant a "residence status" to the Greek Cypriots who went to England following the invasion, but a temporary residence permit renewable every 6 months. In the past 7 years such renewals were made without difficulty but things began to change when the conservative Thatcher party came to power. The British immigration authorities refuse to renew the temporary permits and already more than 200 Greek Cypriot refugees have been deported. The Cypriot High Commission in London fears that the same fate will befall the remaining 2,000 refugees.

### **Denunciation**

The question of the Cypriot refugees was recently raised in the House of Lords when Lord Brockway pointed out that the British government has an obligation to allow these refugees to remain until they are able to return to their homes. Also, the Racial Relations Council in the Camden section of London renounced the stand of the British government in its recent meeting which discussed the question of the refugees who face immediate deportation.

7520

CSO: 4621/105

**FORTHCOMING ARIANE MODIFICATIONS, IMPROVEMENTS VIEWED**

Paris LE MATIN in French 14 Sep 81 p 19

[Article: "Ariane 4: A 'Made-To-Order' Rocket"]

[Text] A new version of the European rocket Ariane 4, which in 1986 is to take over from Models 1, 2 and 3 currently under construction, will be proposed to the ESA [European Space Agency] authorities before the end of this month. This more flexible version of the rocket would offer users the choice of a "made-to-order" model based on the actual load of the satellites to be put into orbit, enabling them thus to bring the cost of the launching more in line with the requirements of the specific mission.

As Jean-Claude Bouillot, head of preliminary planning in the Launcher Division of the CNES [National Center for Space Studies], summarizes the object of the "Ariane 4 alternate version" project, it is "to enable clients to choose Ariane models as they would their personal automobiles." In this new version, the rocket that is called upon to succeed Models 1,2 and 3 in the second half of this decade, would offer more flexibility from the standpoint of performance characteristics, enabling potential users to choose a higher- or lower-powered, and hence a higher- or lower-priced, model.

The launcher, its first stage modified--having four Viking motors instead of the five planned for current models--could be equipped, in accordance with the requirements of the specific mission, with a suitable number of make-up rockets powered by liquid or dry propellant or both at the same time. The satellite weight that could be injected into orbit would thus vary between a minimum of 2,050 kg and a maximum of 4,170 kg, according to the number of motors and their type, instead of between 2,900 and 4,500 kg as is the case of the "basic version" of Ariane 4.

These differences may seem minimal, but at the price per kilogram in orbit and taking into account the close struggle the European launcher must face in competing with the American space shuttle, this possibility of adapting Ariane to the specific mission requirement is far from being negligible. Moreover, the modifications to the first stage would be less extensive, hence less costly, than in the "basic version" projected heretofore.

Is it then to be a "basic version" or an "alternate version"? The ESA Programs Management Board, which will meet in Paris 24 September, must choose between the two projects. This choice must then be ratified by the heads of the Agency. Finally, it will be up to the member nations to decide whether or not they are prepared to participate in the project thus approved. In this regard, the French government may make known its decision, in the very near future, as to its participation in the Ariane 4 program. Its decision may be taken during a closed meeting the minister of research and technology, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, has requested be convened for the beginning of October.

The Ariane 4 development timetable would not be upset by the choice of the new version, the goal still being a first test firing in October 1985 for operational flights to begin in January 1986. The program could get under way during the first quarter of 1982. Meanwhile, construction of a second launch pad is near completion at Kourou, Guyana. The Ariane 4 development cost is estimated at a little over Fr 1 billion (versus over Fr 5 billion for Ariane 1) and the construction of the new launch pad at Fr 600 million.

With regard to Ariane 1, the forth and fifth test launchings, which were delayed because of problems with one of the two Marecs satellites it is to carry, are now scheduled for December.

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CSO: 3100/998

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16 Oct. 1981

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